Iran's View of Obama

Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran

By George Friedman

U.S. President Barack Obama released a video offering Iran congratulations on the occasion of Nowruz, the Persian New Year, on Friday. Israeli President Shimon Peres also offered his best wishes, referring to “the noble Iranian people.” The joint initiative was received coldly in Tehran, however. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said the video did not show that the United States had shifted its hostile attitude toward Iran. 

The video is obviously part of Obama’s broader strategy of demonstrating that his administration has shifted U.S. policy, at least to the extent that it is prepared to open discussions with other regimes (with Iran being the hardest and most controversial case). The U.S. strategy is fairly straightforward: Obama is trying to create a new global perception of the United States. Global opinion was that former U.S. President George W. Bush was unwilling to engage with, and listen to, allies or enemies. Obama’s view is that that perception in itself harmed U.S. foreign policy by increasing suspicion of the United States. For Obama, offering New Year’s greetings to Iran is therefore part of a strategy to change the tone of all aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

Getting Peres to offer parallel greetings was undoubtedly intended to demonstrate to the Iranians that the Israelis would not block U.S. initiatives toward Iran. The Israelis probably were willing to go along with the greetings because they don’t expect them to go very far. They also want to show that they were not responsible for their failure, something critical in their relations with the Obama administration.

The Iranian response is also understandable. The United States has made a series of specific demands on Iran, and has worked to impose economic sanctions on Iran when Tehran has not complied. But Iran also has some fairly specific demands of the United States. It might be useful, therefore, to look at the Iranian view of the United States and the world through its eyes. 

From the Iranian point of view, the United States has made two fundamental demands of Iran. The first is that Iran halt its military nuclear program. The second, a much broader demand, is that Iran stop engaging in what the United States calls terrorism. This ranges from support for Hezbollah to support for Shiite factions in Iraq. In return, the United States is prepared to call for a suspension of sanctions against Iran.

For Tehran, however, the suspension of sanctions is much too small a price to pay for major strategic concessions. First, the sanctions don’t work very well. Sanctions only work when most powers are prepared to comply with them. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese are prepared to systematically comply with sanctions, so there is little that Iran can afford that it can’t get. Iran’s problem is that it cannot afford much. Its economy is in shambles due more to internal problems than to sanctions. Therefore, in the Iranian point of view, the United States is asking for strategic concessions, yet offering very little in return. 

The Nuclear Question

Meanwhile, merely working on a nuclear device — regardless of how close or far Iran really is from having one — provides Iran with a dramatically important strategic lever. The Iranians learned from the North Korean experience that the United States has a nuclear fetish. Having a nuclear program alone was more important to Pyongyang than actually having nuclear weapons. U.S. fears that North Korea might someday have a nuclear device resulted in significant concessions from the United States, Japan and South Korea. 

The danger of having such a program is that the United States — or some other country — might attack and destroy the associated facilities. Therefore, the North Koreans created a high level of uncertainty as to just how far along they were on the road to having a nuclear device and as to how urgent the situation was, raising and lowering alarms like a conductor in a symphony. The Iranians are following the same strategy. They are constantly shifting from a conciliatory tone to an aggressive one, keeping the United States and Israel under perpetual psychological pressure. The Iranians are trying to avoid an attack by keeping the intelligence ambiguous. Tehran’s ideal strategy is maintaining maximum ambiguity and anxiety in the West while minimizing the need to strike immedi ately. Actually obtaining a bomb would increase the danger of an attack in the period between a successful test and the deployment of a deliverable device. 

What the Iranians get out of this is exactly what the North Koreans got: disproportionate international attention and a lever on other topics, along with something that could be sacrificed in negotiations. They also have a chance of actually developing a deliverable device in the confusion surrounding its progress. If so, Iran would become invasion- and even harassment-proof thanks to its apparent instability and ideology. From Tehran’s perspective, abandoning its nuclear program without substantial concessions, none of which have materialized as yet, would be irrational. And the Iranians expect a large payoff from all this.

Radical Islamists, Iraq and Afghanistan

This brings us to the Hezbollah/Iraq question, which in fact represents two very different issues. Iraq constitutes the greatest potential strategic threat to Iran. This is as ancient as Babylon and Persia, as modern as the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Iran wants guarantees that Iraq will never threaten it, and that U.S. forces in Iraq will never pose a threat to Iran. Tehran does not want promises alone; it wants a recognized degree of control over the Iraqi government, or at least negative control that would allow it to stop Baghdad from doing things Iran doesn’t want. To achieve this, Iran systematically has built its influence among factions i n Iraq, permitting it to block Iraqi policies that Iran regards as dangerous. 

The American demand that Iran stop meddling in Iraqi policies strikes the Iranians as if the United States is planning to use the new Baghdad regime to restore the regional balance of power. In fact, that is very much on Washington’s mind. This is completely unacceptable to Iran, although it might benefit the United States and the region. From the Iranian point of view, a fully neutral Iraq — with its neutrality guaranteed by Iranian influence — is the only acceptable outcome. The Iranians regard the American demand that Iran not meddle in Iraq as directly threatening Iranian national security.

There is then the issue of Iranian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and other radical Islamist groups. Between 1979 and 2001, Iran represented the background of the Islamic challenge to the West: The Shia represented radical Islam. When al Qaeda struck, Iran and the Shia lost this place of honor. Now, al Qaeda has faded and Iran wants to reclaim its place. It can do that by supporting Hezbollah, a radical Shiite group that directly challenges Israel, as well as Hamas — a radical Sunni group — thus showing that Iran speaks for all of Islam, a powerful position in an arena that matters a great deal to Iran and the region. Iran’s support for these groups help s it achieve a very important goal at little risk. Meanwhile, the U.S. demand that Iran end this support is not matched by any meaningful counteroffer or by a significant threat. 

Moreover, Tehran dislikes the Obama-Petraeus strategy in Afghanistan. That strategy involves talking with the Taliban, a group that Iran has been hostile toward historically. The chance that the United States might install a Taliban-linked government in Afghanistan represents a threat to Iran second only to the threat posed to it by Iraq.

The Iranians see themselves as having been quite helpful to the United States in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as they helped Washington topple both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. In 2001, they offered to let U.S. aircraft land in Iran, and assured Washington of the cooperation of pro-Iranian factions in Afghanistan. In Iraq, they provided intelligence and helped keep the Shiite population relatively passive after the invasion in 2003. But Iranians see Washington as having betrayed implicit understandings that in return for these services, the Iranians would enjoy a degree of influence in both countries. And the U.S. opening to the Taliban is the last straw. 

Obama’s Greetings in Context

Iran views Obama’s New Year greetings within this context. To them, Obama has not addressed the core issues between the two countries. In fact, apart from videos, Obama’s position on Iran does not appear different from the Bush position. The Iranian leadership does not see why it should respond more favorably to the Obama administration than it did to the Bush administration. Tehran wants to be very sure that Obama understands that the willingness alone to talk is insufficient; some indications of what is to be discussed and what might be offered are necessary.

Many in the U.S. administration believe that the weak Iranian economy might shape the upcoming Iranian presidential election. Undoubtedly, the U.S. greetings were timed to influence the election. Washington has tried to influence internal Iranian politics for decades, constantly searching for reformist elements. The U.S. hope is that someone might be elected in Iran who is so obsessed with the economy that he would trade away strategic and geopolitical interests in return for some sort of economic aid. There are undoubtedly candidates who would be interested in economic aid, but none who are prepared to trade away strategic interests. Nor could they even if they wanted to. The Iran-Iraq war is burned into the popular Iranian consciousness; any candidate who appeared willing to see a strong Iraq would lose the election. American analysts are constantly confusing an Iranian interest in economic aid with a willingness to abandon core interests. But this hasn’t happened, and isn’t happening now. 

This is not to say that the Iranians won’t bargain. Beneath the rhetoric, they are practical to the extreme. Indeed, the rhetoric is part of the bargaining. What is not clear is whether Obama is prepared to bargain. What will he give for the things he wants? Economic aid is not enough for Iran, and in any event, the idea of U.S. economic aid for Iran during a time of recession is a non-starter. Is Obama prepared to offer Iran a dominant voice in Iraq and Afghanistan? How insistent is Obama on the Hezbollah and Hamas issue? What will he give if Iran shuts down its nuclear program? It is not clear that Obama has answers to these questions. 

Rebuilding the U.S. public image is a reasonable goal for the first 100 days of a presidency. But soon it will be summer, and the openings Obama has made will have to be walked through, with tough bargaining. In the case of Iran — one of the toughest cases of all — it is hard to see how Washington can give Tehran the things it wants because that would make Iran a major regional power. And it is hard to see how Iran could give away the things the Americans are demanding. 

Obama indicated that it would take time for his message to generate a positive response from the Iranians. It is more likely that unless the message starts to take on more substance that pleases the Iranians, the response will remain unchanged. The problem wasn’t Bush or Clinton or Reagan, the problem was the reality of Iran and the United States. Only if a third power frightened the Iranians sufficiently — a third power that also threatened the United States — would U.S.-Iranian interests be brought together. But Russia, at least for now, is working very hard to be friendly with Iran.

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

Turkey’s Secret Power Brokers

The Islamists aren't getting rid of Turkey's shady Deep State, but replacing it with one of their own.
By Soner Cagaptay | NEWSWEEK

Published Mar 21, 2009

Conspiracy theories have been popular in the former Ottoman Empire ever since the 19th century, when Turkey became a pawn in Great Power games. But even by that standard, the current stories swirling around Istanbul and Ankara take the cake. Tales of a sinister "Deep State" (Derin Devlet) have surfaced in a recent court case alleging that underneath Turkey's modern democracy lies a powerful but invisible security and bureaucratic establishment that is plotting to undermine the elected government.

The charges have arisen in a case known as Ergenekon. According to government prosecutors, the Deep State, identified as a group of judges, journalists, union leaders, artists and retired military officers, were plotting a coup against the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). The court papers say these secular nationalists were also, implausibly, planning Islamist, Marxist and pro-Kurdish terror attacks—all at the same time. In any other Western society, such incoherent accusations would be dismissed as fantasy. In Turkey, they've gained traction, for the simple reason that the country has long had a dominant security clique. Yet what the current rumors miss is that that power base has been broken up in recent years. Today it's the Islamists who are pulling the strings.

The old Deep State surfaced at various times in Turkey's history, stepping in to remove elected governments that strayed too far from the secular legacy of Kemal Atatürk, modern Turkey's founder. The sometimes corrupt and cozy links built by this establishment came to light most spectacularly in 1996, when an unlikely foursome—a politician, a police chief, a beauty queen and a drug lord—got into a car accident. Only the politician survived, and the ensuing embarrassing press coverage allowed Turkey's increasingly robust middle class to push back against this corrupt elite that had long limited their freedoms.


The Deep State was further weakened by the European Union accession process, which began soon after. In 1999, the EU decided to consider Turkey's candidacy—but only if Ankara improved civil liberties, weakened the military's role in politics and consolidated the country's democracy. Then, in 2002, the AKP came to power. At first it seemed to abandon its Islamist roots and embrace EU accession in order to win liberal support. Many Turkish democrats hoped the AKP would eliminate the Deep State once and for all and threw their support behind the party.

Yet in the seven years since, rather than get rid of the shadowy power brokers, the AKP has used cases like Ergenekon—which seems to have involved a genuine plot to overthrow the government—to attack Turkey's secular judges, media, its military and practically any political opponents. The police have taken more than 100 supposed plotters into custody, including not just underworld figures, but also journalists, military officers, businesspeople, judges and academics. Political opponents of the AKP have been pulled out of bed in the early morning hours, only to be released after three days of harsh police questioning. Unsurprisingly, many of these "suspects" have subsequently become much more docile.

Lest there be any doubt about the absurdity of some of the government's claims, consider: the Ergenekon case is based in part on the testimony of one Tuncay Guney, who claims to be a former Turkish intelligence officer now living in exile in Canada—where he says he's become a Hasidic rabbi. Never mind the fact that the Toronto Jewish community says Guney is neither a rabbi nor even Jewish; his assumed identity fits neatly into the anti-Semitism of Turkey's Islamists, who like to portray Jews as a nefarious influence in their country. Some of the allegations are also wildly contradictory. For example, prosecutors claim that Ergenekon plotters were backed by Washington. Yet they also say they planned to attack NATO installations in Turkey.

The tragedy here is that the AKP is not just using Ergenekon to rid Turkey of the old Deep State, but to intimidate its legitimate opposition ahead of nationwide local elections on March 29. As the last elections suggested, more than half the population still opposes the AKP, but many are now afraid to speak out due to signs that the government is monitoring its enemies. Journalists critical of the government have had embarrassing personal conversations leaked to pro-AKP media, and the police have recorded more than 1.5 million phone calls and e-mails in the Ergenekon case alone.

Such signs suggest that the AKP has replaced the old Deep State with a new one of its own. While still using the ghost of the previous establishment to conduct a witch hunt, now the Islamists are pulling the levers of power. The Deep State may have once functioned to intimidate communists and Islamists, but today it is used against secular, liberal and nationalist Turks in order to crush dissent. Turkey's progressives must be heartbroken. They hoped that political modernization and the AKP would finally rid their state of conspiracy theories and shadowy powers behind the throne. But such a change would have required a liberal party at the country's helm.

Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of "Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?"

Conflating History with Theology

The holy book of Islam, the Qur'an

Judeo-Christian Violence vs. Islamic Violence

by Raymond Ibrahim
Jihad Watch

March 15, 2009

Especially after the terrorist strikes of 9/11, Islam has often been accused of being intrinsically violent. Many point to the Koran and other Islamic scriptures and texts as proof that violence and intolerance vis-à-vis non-Muslims is inherent to Islam. In response, a number of apologetics have been offered. The fundamental premise of almost all of these is that Islam's purported violence—as found in Islamic scriptures and history—is no different than the violence committed by other religious groups throughout history and as recorded in their scriptures, such as Jews and Christians. The argument, in short, is that it is not Islam per se but rather human nature that is prone to violence.

So whenever the argument is made that the Koran as well as the historical words and deeds of Islam's prophet Muhammad and his companions evince violence and intolerance, the counter-argument is immediately made: What about the historical atrocities committed by the Hebrews in years gone by and as recorded in their scriptures (AKA, the Old Testament)? What about the brutal cycle of violence Christians have committed in the name of their faith against both fellow Christians and non-Christians?

Several examples are then offered from the Bible as well as Judeo-Christian history. Two examples especially—one biblical, the other historic—are often cited as paradigmatic of the religious violence inherent to both Judaism and Christianity and usually put an end to the debate of whether Islam is unique in regards to its teachings and violence.

The first is the military conquest of the land of Canaan by the Hebrews (c. 1200 BC), which has increasingly come to be characterized as a "genocide." Yahweh told Moses:
But of the cities of these peoples which Yahweh your God gives you as an inheritance, you shall let nothing that breathes remain alive, but you shall utterly destroy them—the Hittite, Amorite, Canaanite, Perizzite, Hivite, and Jebusite—just as Yahweh your God has commanded you, lest they teach you to do according to all their abominations which they have done for their gods, and you sin against Yahweh your God (Deuteronomy 20: 16-18). 

So Joshua [Moses' successor] conquered all the land: the mountain country and the South and the lowland and the wilderness slopes, and all their kings; he left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as Yahweh God of Israel had commanded (Joshua 10:40).

The second example revolves around the Crusader wars waged by Medieval European Christians. To be sure, the Crusades were a "counter-attack" on Islam—not an unprovoked assault as is often depicted by revisionist history. A united Christendom sought to annex the Holy Land of Jerusalem, which, prior to its conquest by Islam in the 7th century, was an integral part of Christendom for nearly 400 years.

Moreover, Muslim invasions and atrocities against Christians were on the rise in the decades before the Crusades were launched in 1096. For example, in 1071, the Seljuk Turks had crushed the Byzantines in the pivotal battle of Manzikert and in effect annexed a major chunk of Byzantine Anatolia (opening the way for the eventual capture of Constantinople centuries later). A few decades earlier, the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim desecrated and destroyed a number of important churches—such as the Church of St. Mark in Egypt and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem—and decreed several even more oppressive than usual decrees against Christians and Jews. It is in this backdrop that Pope Urban called for the Crusades:
From the confines of Jerusalem and the city of Constantinople a horrible tale has gone forth and very frequently has been brought to our ears, namely, that a race from the kingdom of the Persians [i.e., Muslim Turks]…has invaded the lands of those Christians and has depopulated them by the sword, pillage and fire; it has led away a part of the captives into its own country, and a part it has destroyed by cruel tortures; it has either entirely destroyed the churches of God or appropriated them for the rites of its own religion (from the chronicles of Robert the Monk).

Nonetheless, history attests that these Crusades were violent and bloody. After breaching the walls of Jerusalem in 1099, the Crusaders slaughtered almost every single inhabitant of the Holy City. According to the Medieval chronicle, the Gesta Danorum "the slaughter was so great that our men waded in blood up to their ankles." Moreover, there is the 1204 sack of Constantinople, wherein Crusader slew Christian.

In light of the above—one a prime example of "Hebraic" violence from the Bible, the other from Christian history—why should Islam be the one religion always characterized as intrinsically violent, simply because its holy book and its history also contain violence? Why should non-Muslims always point to the Koran and ancient history as evidence of Islam's violence while never looking to their own scriptures and history?

While such questions are popular, they reveal a great deal of confusion between history and theology, between the temporal actions of men and what are understood to be the immutable words of God. The fundamental error being that Judeo-Christian history—which is violent—is being conflated with Islamic theology—which commands violence. Of course all religions have had their fair share of violence and intolerance towards the "other." Whether this violence is ordained by God or whether warlike man merely wished it thus is the all-important question.

Old Testament violence is an interesting case in point. Yahweh clearly ordered the Hebrews to annihilate the Canaanites and surrounding peoples. Such violence is therefore an expression of God's will, for good or ill. Regardless, all the historic violence committed by the Hebrews and recorded in the Old Testament is just that—history. It happened; God commanded it. But it revolved around a specific time and place and was directed against a specific people. At no time did such violence go on to become standardized or codified into Jewish law (i.e., the Halakha).

This is where Islamic violence is unique. Though similar to the violence of the Old Testament—commanded by God and manifested in history—certain aspects of Islamic violence have become standardized in Islamic law (i.e., Sharia) and apply at all times. Thus while the violence found in the Koran is in fact historical, its ultimate significance is theological, or, more specifically, doctrinal. Consider the following Koranic verses, better known as the "sword-verses":
Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the pagans wherever you find them—take them [captive], besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due [i.e. submit to Islam], then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful (K 9:5). 

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger [i.e. do not adhere to Islamic law], nor acknowledge the religion of Truth [i.e. Islam], from the people of the book [i.e. Jews and Christians], until they pay tribute with willing submission, and feel themselves utterly subdued (K 9:29).

As with Old Testament verses where Yahweh commanded the Hebrews to attack and slay their neighbors, the sword-verses also have a historical context. Allah first issued these commandments after the Muslims under Muhammad's leadership had grown sufficiently strong enough to invade their Christian and pagan neighbors. But unlike the bellicose verses and anecdotes of the Old Testament, the sword-verses became fundamental to Islam's subsequent relationship to both the "people of the book" (Christians and Jews) and the "pagans" (Hindus, Buddhists, animists, etc). For instance, based on 9:5, Islamic law mandates that pagans and polytheists must either convert to Islam or be killed, while 9:29 is the primary source of Islam's well-known discriminatory practices against Christians and Jews.

In fact, based on the sword-verses (as well as countless other Koranic verses and oral traditions attributed to Muhammad), Islam's scholars, sheikhs, muftis, imams, and qadis throughout the ages have all reached the consensus—binding on the entire Muslim community—that Islam is to be at perpetual war with the non-Muslim world until the former subsumes the latter. (It is widely held by Muslim scholars that since the sword-verses are among the final revelations on the topic of Islam's relationship to non-Muslims, that they alone have abrogated some 200 of the Koran's earlier and more tolerant verses, such as "there is no coercion in religion" 2:256.) Famous Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun, who is revered in the West for his "progressive" insights, also puts to rest the notion that jihad is "defensive" warfare:
In the Muslim community, the holy war [jihad] is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and the obligation to convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force...The other religious groups did not have a universal mission, and the holy war was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes of defense... They are merely required to establish their religion among their own people. That is why the Israeilites after Moses and Joshua remained unconcerned with royal authority [e.g. a "caliphate"]. Their only concern was to establish their religion [not spread it to the nations]… But Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations (The Muqudimmah, vol. 1 pg. 473).

Perhaps what is most unique about the sword-verses is the fact that when juxtaposed to their Old Testament counterparts, they are especially distinct for using language that transcends time and space, inciting believers to attack and slay non-believers today no less than yesterday. Yahweh commanded the Hebrews to kill Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites—all specific peoples rooted to a specific time and place. At no time did Yahweh give an open-ended command for the Hebrews, and by extension their descendants the Jews, to fight and kill gentiles. On the other hand, though Islam's original enemies were, like Judaism's, historical (e.g., Christian Byzantines and pagan Persians), the Koran rarely singles them out by their proper names. Instead, Muslims were (and are) commanded to fight the people of the book—"until they pay tribute with willing submission and feel themselves utterly subdued" (Koran 9:29) and to "slay the pagans wherever you find them" (Koran 9:5).

The two conjunctions "until" (hata) and "wherever" (haythu) demonstrate the perpetual and ubiquitous nature of these commandments: there are still "people of the book" who have yet to be "utterly subdued" (especially in the Americas, Europe, and Israel) and "pagans" to be slain "wherever" one looks (especially Asia and sub-Saharan Africa). In fact, the salient feature of almost all of the violent commandments in Islamic scriptures is their open-ended and generic nature: "Fight them [non-Muslims] until there is no more chaos and all religion belongs to Allah" (Koran 8:39). Also, in a well-attested tradition that appears in the most authentic hadith collections, Muhammad proclaims:
I have been commanded to wage war against mankind until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah; and that they establish prostration prayer, and pay the alms-tax [i.e., convert to Islam]. If they do so, their blood and property are protected [Sahih Muslim C9B1N31; also in Sahih Bukhari B2N24].

Aside from the divine words of the Koran, Muhammad's pattern of behavior—his "Sunna" or "example"—is an extremely important source of legislation in Islam. Muslims are exhorted to emulate Muhammad in all walks of life: "You have indeed in the Messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern [of conduct]" (Koran 33:21). And Muhammad's pattern of conduct vis-à-vis non-Muslims is quite explicit. Sarcastically arguing against the concept of "moderate" Islam, terrorist Osama bin Laden, who enjoys half the Arab-Islamic world's support per an al-Jazeera poll, portrays the prophet's Sunna thus:
"Moderation" is demonstrated by our prophet who did not remain more than three months in Medina without raiding or sending a raiding party into the lands of the infidels to beat down their strongholds and seize their possessions, their lives, and their women" (from The Al-Qaeda Reader, page 56).

In fact, based on both the Koran and Muhammad's Sunna, pillaging and plundering infidels, enslaving their children, and placing their women in concubinage is well founded (e.g. 4:24, 4:92, 8:69, 24:33, 33:50, etc.). And the concept of "Sunna"—which is what 90% of the billion plus Muslims, the "Sunnis," are named after—essentially asserts that anything performed or approved by Muhammad and his early companions is applicable for Muslims today no less than yesterday. This does not mean that Muslims in mass are wild hedonists who live only to plunder and rape. But it does mean that those particular persons who are naturally inclined to such activities, and who also happen to be Muslim, can—and do—quite easily justify their actions by referring to the "Sunna of the Prophet"—the way al-Qaeda, for example, justifies its attacks on 9/11 where innocents, including women and children, were killed: Muhammad authorized his followers to use catapults during their siege of the town of Taif in 630 A.D., though he was aware that women and children were sheltered there. Also, when asked if it was permissible to launch night raids or set fire to the fortifications of the infidels if women and children were among them, the prophet is said to have responded, "They are from among them" (Sahih Muslim B19N4321).

While law-centric and legalistic, Judaism has no such equivalent to the Sunna; the words and deeds of the patriarchs, though recorded in the Old Testament, never went on to be part of Jewish law. Neither Abraham's "white-lies," nor Jacob's perfidy, nor Moses' short-fuse, nor David's adultery, nor Solomon's philandering ever went on to instruct Jews or Christians. They were merely understood to be historical actions perpetrated by fallible men who were often punished by God for their less than ideal behavior.

As for Christianity, much of the Old Testament law was abrogated by Jesus. "Eye for an eye" gave way to "turn the other cheek." Totally loving God and one's neighbor became supreme law (Matt 22:38-40). Furthermore, Jesus' "Sunna"—as in "What would Jesus do?"—is characterized by altruism. The New Testament contains absolutely no exhortations to violence. Still, there are some who strive to portray Jesus as having a similar militant ethos as Muhammad by quoting the verse where Jesus—who "spoke to the multitudes in parables and without a parable spoke not" (Matt 13:34)—said, "I come not to bring peace but a sword" (Matt 10:34). But based on the context of this statement, it is clear that Jesus was not commanding violence against non-Christians, but was predicting that strife will often exist between Christian converts and their environment—a prediction that was only too true as early Christians, far from taking up the sword, passively perished by the sword in martyrdom (as they still do today in many Muslim nations). At any rate, how can one honestly compare this one New Testament verse that metaphorically mentions the word "sword" to the literally hundreds of Koranic injunctions and statements by Muhammad that clearly command Muslims to take up a very real sword against non-Muslims?

And it is from here that one can best appreciate the Crusades. However one interprets these wars—as offensive or defensive, just or unjust—it is evident that they were not based on the "Sunna" of Jesus, who exhorted his followers to "love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who spitefully use you and persecute you" (Matt 5:44).

In fact, far from suggesting anything intrinsic to Christianity, the Crusades ironically help better explain Islam. For what the Crusades demonstrated once and for all is that, irrespective of religious teachings—indeed, in the case of these so-called "Christian" Crusades, despite them—man is in fact predisposed to violence and intolerance. But this begs the question: If this is how Christians behaved—who are commanded to love, bless, and do good to their enemies who hate, curse, and persecute them—how much more can be expected of Muslims who, while sharing the same violent tendencies, are further validated by the Deity's command to attack, kill, and plunder non-believers?

source: Middle East Forum 

Counterterrorism Funding: Old Fears and Cyclical Lulls

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

Two years ago, we wrote an article discussing the historical pattern of the boom and bust in counterterrorism spending. In that article we discussed the phenomenon whereby a successful terrorist attack creates a profound shock that is quite often followed by an extended lull. We noted how this dynamic tends to create a pendulum effect in public perception and how public opinion is ultimately translated into public policy that produces security and counterterrorism funding. 

In other words, the shock of a successful terrorist attack creates a crisis environment in which the public demands action from the government and Washington responds by earmarking vast amounts of funds to address the problem. Then the lull sets in, and some of the programs created during the crisis are scrapped entirely or are killed by a series of budget cuts as the public’s perception of the threat changes and its demands for government action focus elsewhere. The lull eventually is shattered by another attack — and another infusion of money goes to address the now-neglected problem.

On March 13, The Washington Post carried a story entitled “Hardened U.S. Embassies Symbolic of Old Fears, Critics Say.” The story discussed the new generation of U.S. Embassy buildings, which are often referred to as “Inman buildings” by State Department insiders. This name refers to buildings constructed in accordance with the physical security standards set by the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, a panel chaired by former Deputy CIA Director Adm. Bobby Inman following the 1983 attacks against the U.S. embassies in Beirut and Kuwait City. The 1985 Inman report, which established these security requirements and contributed to one of the historical security spending booms, was also responsible for beefing up the State Department’s Office of Security and transforming it into the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). 

It has been 11 years since a U.S. Embassy has been reduced to a smoking hole in the ground, and the public’s perception of the threat appears to be changing once again. In The Washington Post article, Stephen Schlesinger, an adjunct fellow at the Century Foundation, faults the new Inman building that serves as the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York for being unattractive and uninviting. Schlesinger is quoted as saying: “Rather than being an approachable, beckoning embassy — emphasizing America’s desire to open up to the rest of the globe and convey our historically optimistic and progressive values — it sits across from the U.N. headquarters like a dark, forbidding fortress, saying, ‘Go away.’” When opinion leaders begin to express such sentiments in The Washington Post, it is an indication that we are now in the lull period of the counterterrorism cycle. 

Tensions Over Security

There has always been a tension between security and diplomacy in the U.S. State Department. There are some diplomats who consider security to be antithetical to diplomacy and, like Mr. Schlesinger, believe that U.S. diplomatic facilities need to be open and accessible rather than secure. These foreign service officers (FSOs) also believe that regional security officers are too risk averse and that they place too many restrictions on diplomats to allow them to practice effective diplomacy. (Regional security officer — RSO — is the title given to a DSS special agent in charge of security at an embassy.) To quote one FSO, DSS special agents are “cop-like morons.” People who carry guns instead of demarches and who go out and arrest people for passport and visa fraud are simply not considered “diplomatic.” There is also the thorny issue that in their counterintelligence role, DSS agents are often forced to confront FSOs over personal behavio r (such as sexual proclivities or even crimes) that could be considered grounds for blackmail by a hostile intelligence service. 

On the other side of the coin, DSS agents feel the animosity emanating from those in the foreign service establishment who are hostile to security and who oppose the DSS efforts to improve security at diplomatic missions overseas. DSS agents refer to these FSOs as “black dragons” — a phrase commonly uttered in conjunction with a curse. DSS agents see themselves as the ones left holding the bag when an FSO disregards security guidelines, does something reckless, and is robbed, raped or murdered. It is most often the RSO and his staff who are responsible for going out and picking up the pieces when something turns bad. It is also the RSO who is called before a U.S. government accountability review board when an embassy is attacked and destroyed. In the eyes of a DSS special agent, then, a strong, well-protected building conveys a far better representation of American values and strength than does a smoldering hole in the ground, where an “accessible&# 8221; embassy once stood. In the mind of a DSS agent, dead diplomats can conduct no diplomacy. 

This internal tension has also played a role in the funding boom and bust for diplomatic security overseas. Indeed, DSS agents are convinced that the black dragons consistently attempt to cut security budgets during the lull periods. When career foreign service officers like Sheldon Krys and Anthony Quainton were appointed to serve as assistant secretaries for diplomatic security — and presided over large cuts in budgets and manpower — many DSS agents were convinced that Krys and Quainton had been placed in that position specifically to sabotage the agency. 

DSS agents were suspicious of Quainton, in particular, because of his history. In February 1992, while Quainton was serving as the U.S. ambassador to Peru, the ambassador’s residence in Lima was attacked by Shining Path guerrillas who detonated a large vehicular-borne improvised explosive device in the street next to it. A team sent by the DSS counterterrorism investigations division to investigate the attack concluded in its report that Quainton’s refusal to follow the RSO’s recommendation to alter his schedule was partially responsible for the attack. The report angered Quainton, who became the assistant secretary for diplomatic security seven months later. Shortly after assuming his post, Quainton proclaimed to his staff that “terrorism is dead” and ordered the abolishment of the DSS counterterrorism investigations division. 

Using a little bureaucratic sleight of hand, then-DSS Director Clark Dittmer renamed the office the Protective Intelligence Investigations Division (PII) and allowed it to maintain its staff and function. Although Quainton had declared terrorism dead, special agents assigned to the PII office would be involved in the investigation of the first known al Qaeda attacks against U.S. interests in Aden and Sanaa,Yemen, in December 1992. They also played a significant role in the investigation of the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, the investigation of the 1993 New York Landmarks Plot and many subsequent terrorism cases. 
Boom-and-Bust Funding

One of the problems problem created by the feast-or-famine cycle of security funding is that during the boom times, when there is a sudden (and often huge) influx of cash, agencies sometimes have difficulty spending all the money allotted to them in a logical and productive manner. Congress, acting on strong public opinion, often will give an agency even more than it initially requested for a particular program — and then expect an immediate solution to the problem. Rather than risk losing these funds, the agencies scramble to find ways to spend them. Then, quite often, by the time the agency is able to get its act together and develop a system effectively to use the funds, the lull has set in and funding is cut. These cuts frequently are accompanied by criticism of how the agency spent the initial glut of funding.

Whether or not it was a conscious effort on the part of people like Quainton, funding for diplomatic security programs was greatly reduced during the lull period of the 1990s. In addition to a reduction in the funding provided to build new embassies or bring existing buildings up to Inman standards, RSOs were forced to make repeated cuts in budgets for items such as local guard forces, residential security and the maintenance of security equipment such as closed-circuit TV cameras and vehicular barriers. 

These budget cuts were identified as a contributing factor in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The final report of the Crowe Commission, which was established to investigate the attacks, notes that its accountability review board members “were especially disturbed by the collective failure of the U.S. government over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the world.”

The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi was known to be vulnerable. Following the August 1997 raid on the Nairobi residence of Wadih el-Hage, U.S. officials learned that el-Hage and his confederates had conducted extensive pre-operational surveillance against the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, indicating that they planned to attack the facility. The U.S. ambassador in Nairobi, citing the embassy’s vulnerability to car bomb attacks, asked the state department in December 1997 to authorize a relocation of the embassy to a safer place. In its January 1998 denial of the request, the state department said that, in spite of the threat and vulnerability, the post’s “medium” terrorism threat level did not warrant the expenditure. 

Old Fears

The 1998 East Africa embassy bombings highlighted the consequences of the security budget cuts that came during the lull years. Clearly, terrorism was not dead then, nor is it dead today, in spite of the implications in the March 13 Washington Post article. Indeed, the current threat of attacks directed against U.S. diplomatic facilities is very real. Since January 2008, we have seen attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities in Sanaa, Yemen; Istanbul, Turkey; Kabul, Afghanistan; Belgrade, Serbia; and Monterrey, Mexico (as well as attacks against Ameri can diplomats in Pakistan, Sudan and Lebanon). Since 2001, there have also been serious attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Karachi, Pakistan; Damascus, Syria; Athens, Greece; and Baghdad, Iraq. 

Even if one believes, as we do, that al Qaeda’s abilities have been severely degraded since 9/11, it must be recognized that the group and its regional franchises still retain the ability to conduct tactical strikes. In fact, due to the increased level of security at U.S. diplomatic missions, most of the attacks conducted by jihadists have been directed against softer targets such as hotels or the embassies of other foreign countries. Indeed, attacks that were intended to be substantial strikes against U.S. diplomatic facilities in places like Sanaa, Jeddah and Istanbul have been thwarted by the security measures in place at those facilities. Even in Damascus, where the embassy was an older facility that did not meet Inman standards, adequate security measures (aided by poor planning and execution on the part of the attackers) helpe d thwart a potentially disastrous attack. 

However, in spite of the phrase “war on terrorism,” terrorism is a tactic and not an entity. One cannot kill or destroy a tactic. Historically, terrorism has been used by a wide array of actors ranging from neo-Nazis to anarchists and from Maoists to jihadists. Even when the Cold War ended and many of the state-sponsored terrorist groups lost their funding, the tactic of terrorism endured. Even if the core al Qaeda leaders were killed or captured tomorrow and the jihadist threat were neutralized next week, terrorism would not go away. As we have previously pointed out, ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals. There will always be actors with various ideologies who will embrace terrorism as a tactic to strike a stronger enemy, and as the sole global superpower, the U.S. and its diplomatic missions will be target ed for terrorist attacks for the foreseeable future — or at least the next 100 years.

During this time, the booms and busts of counterterrorism and security spending will continue in response to successful attacks and in the lulls between spectacular terrorist strikes like 9/11. During the lulls in this cycle, it will be easy for complacency to slip in — especially when there are competing financial needs. But terrorism is not going to go away any time soon, and when emotion is removed from the cycle, a logical and compelling argument emerges for consistently supplying enough money to protect U.S. embassies and other essential facilities.


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Bosnia: What Is To Be Done?

By Morton Abramowitz and Daniel Serwer

Bosnia is stuck. Its Bosniak Muslim leader, Haris Silajzic, stridently calls for abolition of the Serb entity (Republika Srpska), whose prime minister, Milorad Dodik, wants increased autonomy and threatens a referendum on independence.

By taking extreme positions, Dodik and Silajdzic polarize voters, frightening most Serbs and many Muslims into lending their support. The Dayton Constitution's ethnic veto provisions allow each to block the rival's policies. Neither has the votes needed to amend the Constitution, which ensures Republika Srpska a large measure of autonomy but also requires that the Serbs participate in the central government. Deadlock obstructs much-needed constitutional change.

Politics is "war by other means" for both leaders, with a risk that the situation could degenerate into instability and even renewed violence.
 
The Europeans, to whom Washington has passed responsibility for the Balkans, have been unsuccessful in using their leverage to end the bickering between Silajdzic and Dodik. It doesn't help that the EU's growing membership renders consensus-building difficult. This has contributed to the erosion of the powers and influence of the international community's "High Representative," also the EU Special Representative. A new one due to be named soon will fail unless something is done to strengthen his position.

The closest Bosnia has come to constitutional reform was an effort in 2005-6 led by the U.S. Institute of Peace. The proposed constitutional amendments came within two votes of a two-thirds majority in the Bosnian parliament, in which Silajdzic's party--despite participating in preparation of the package--voted against.

Ideally, the Bosnians themselves would undertake to amend their own constitution, which fails to measure up to European standards, according to the Council of Europe. But they are more interested in political posturing and cosmetic changes than in trying to Europeanize their government structures.

The international effort to promote constitutional reform needs to be revived, this time with European leverage and American resolve. As a start, the EU and the US should declare that the present constitutional situation in Bosnia is unacceptable and must be changed. If that produces no results, the Dayton conference should be reconvened, with all its original participants: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and its two entities (Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation) as well as the EU, UK, France, Germany and Russia. After consultations with all participants, the U.S. and the EU would prepare a draft new constitution that meets European standards.

The EU would make potential Bosnian membership contingent on agreed constitutional change. Conditional EU membership is the single greatest point of leverage for stimulating productive change in Bosnia.

Croatia, which has substantially advanced towards EU membership, can help pull Bosnia in the right direction. Serbia, which has sometimes encouraged Dodik's posturing, would be put on notice that a successful conference is a condition for its own progress towards the EU.

Such a conference could only be called if the parameters were clear: no partition of Bosnia would be permitted. Only its internal governing arrangements, specifically the ethnic veto provisions, would be at issue, with the goal of meeting the Council of Europe requirements. Other Balkan issues--in particular Kosovo--would be left aside, as at the original Dayton conference.

This Dayton II would remain in session until solutions are reached. Once the conference had concluded, the required constitutional amendments and any implementing legislation would be submitted to the Bosnian Parliament for approval. The parliaments of Republika Srpska and the Federation would also have to approve any required amendments to their constitutions.

Granted, an effort of this sort faces serious risks of failure, both at the conference itself and in the legislative moves required thereafter. But continuing to allow Bosnia to drift entails greater risks. The last war in Bosnia displaced half of its four million people and cost the Americans and Europeans tens of billions of dollars to repair.

Success of another Dayton would mean an end to the long-running international intervention in Bosnia and to the powers exercised by the High Representative. EU forces would be gradually removed. Bosnia would be on the path to EU membership, hopefully following close on the heels of Croatia, which is already a candidate. Serbia would have an opportunity to accelerate its progress towards the EU, which has been lagging. In the end, only the promise of EU accession will end the deep-seated nationalist frictions among Balkan countries.

Dayton ended a war but did not create a durable state. Fourteen years of trying to implement the Dayton agreements has not produced a Bosnia worthy of EU membership. If President Obama and EU leaders believe that "aggressive diplomacy" can be used to prevent conflict and build a state, Bosnia would be a good place to start. Its membership in the EU would a fine place to finish.

WHERE IS TURKEY GOING AND WHY?: A PANEL DISCUSSION

Panel Discussion
On January 22, 2009, the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, the U.S. Department of State's International Information Programs in Washington D.C., and the Public Affairs Office at the U.S. Embassy in Israel jointly held an international videoconference seminar focusing on recent changes in Turkish politics and foreign policy. The discussion has been updated and edited.
Brief biographies of the participants can be found at the end of the article. This seminar is part of the GLORIA Center's Experts Forum series.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Turkey is always interesting, always important, but right now it is even more interesting and more important. The question is the country's direction. The current regime, which has been in power long enough and has won enough elections by large margins, is getting more confident. It is doing what it wants, rather than being restrained by fear that if it were to go too far toward Islamic, or Islamist, policies it would alienate the voters. Clearly we have seen the regime move toward Iran and Syria, and away from the United States and Israel. The European Union (EU) seems no closer to admitting Turkey, a source of frustration for Turkey and a process likely to be made more difficult by the government's behavior. Let me stress that the issues here involve not only foreign policy but the Justice and Development (AK) party's systematic effort to gain what seems to be intended as an irreversible hegemony over Turkish politics and society.
HOW HAS TURKEY CHANGED?
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: I think Turkey is changing and has changed on four levels. The first is the erosion of certain liberal democratic values, such as media freedom and gender equality, especially gender equality. For example, in government employment, the number of women in high-level positions is decreasing. As for the media, about half is now owned by the government or by pro-government interests, far more than a few years ago. One part of the media continues with fairly reasonable journalistic standards on issues, while the other half follows the government line. The weakening of such institutions and values is an important element in undermining democracy.
The second area of change is Turkey's relations with the EU. We were all very excited when accession talks with the EU began. Now this train is stalled, and there are several factors to blame for it. The French have objected to it, the Greek Cypriots have provided the alibi, the Austrians don't want Turkey, but the government of Turkey as well has not been pushing for reforms or making them the main focus of its agenda. For instance, in 2005, Turkey started the talks with the EU. That was the year we really saw the dream of Europe and Turkey come close to being a reality. But in 2005, the AK government declared it was not the year of Europe, but the year of Africa. So how serious are they in this regard?
If the process has now come to an almost complete halt, there is also an aspect of domestic politics, and we should all question to what extent the AK is committed to Turkey's accession. After all, it would have to go through a politically costly set of reforms that it is not interested in pursuing because these would cost it domestic popularity.
Third, is Turkey's lower commitment to Turkey's traditional Western alliances, including, for example, Turkey's position on Iran, which is weaker than even before. Whereas Turkey's position until recently was that it did not object to Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in December 2008, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in Washington, he gave a speech saying that countries that objected to Iran's nuclear weapons should themselves not have nuclear weapons. The country has thus moved further from the U.S. position.
Turkey's position on Israel is another example of this phenomenon. Typically, Turkey would have responded to Israel's military operations in Gaza by urging restraint on both sides and hoping the hostilities would end quickly. Yet this was the first time Turkey departed from its established policy and basically bashed Israel for violence without putting any blame on Hamas for rocket attacks before or during the incursion. The government spoke as if Israel had caused the war and would keep causing war.
Fourth, there are powerfully negative public attitudes in Turkey toward the United States and Israel. Opinion polls show that the United States always ranks in the lower teens. Perhaps this will change with the Obama administration, but it will go back down pretty soon, when Turks realize that Obama is going to oppose Iran's nuclear weapons drive and is not going to change U.S. policy significantly. Regarding Israel, popular attitudes are even more negative, in the single digits. This situation has even led to antisemitic incidents in Turkey, a shocking and shaming development in my view in a country that has for 500 years provided a safe haven for Jews. That tradition seems to be eroded right now and is changing in front of our very eyes.
Why should all this matter to those outside Turkey? After all, it could be argued that Turkey's stance on certain issues--Iraq, Afghanistan, and al-Qa'ida--meet U.S. or Western needs. I think we should be concerned about these four elements of change for the following reasons:
Among the 57 countries that are members to the Organization of Islamic Countries, what makes Turkey unique? It is because it is a Muslim country a) which is a secular democracy; b) is in accession talks with the EU; c) is a NATO member; and d) has normal relations with Israel. You cannot find any other predominantly Muslim country with any of these characteristics.
Yet on all four of these aspects, we are seeing Turkey's uniqueness coming undone; there are even issues with NATO. My sense and predication is that in the short term, the Turkish-Israeli relationship will go into a low profile phase where, as Barry said, objectively, military, security, and intelligence operations will continue but will not be spoken about. But if the persisting problem of a government not crazy about this relationship and a public that opposes the relationship is not addressed in Turkey then the relationship will decline. In a democracy, popular opinion eventually shapes foreign policy. If anti-Israeli views persist in Turkey, and the relationship loses its public/economic component, which acts as a shock absorber, sooner or later, public opinion will shape, trim, and erode the Turkish-Israeli relationship.
Dr. Ian Lesser: One of the things I find very striking in Turkey is the steady deterioration of views about the West, Europe, Israel, and the United States. The secular opposition and the military and security establishment were traditionally very NATO- focused. These are now hotbeds of nationalism. I just came back from Turkey and strong language about Gaza wasn't just coming from the AK party, it was also coming from the nationalist opposition, secular leftist, and secular rightists.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I found the discussion a little bit one-sided. While it is true that there has been growing anti-Americanism, or anti-Bushism, I would argue strongly that the more nationalistic, more anti-American party is the CHP (Republican People's Party), partly because it is in opposition. When you look across the spectrum, it is not the AK that is the most anti-American. Similarly, when you look at the question of the EU, yes, there has been a slowdown in reform and it is regrettable and very troubling.
On the other hand, you need to look also at the EU's behavior. Two of the main members, France and Germany, have essentially walked away from the basic principles of the EU accession negotiations and now are trying to talk about a privileged partnership. The EU has not lived up to its original agreement to lift the trade embargo against northern Cyprus. All these developments have led to a decline in Turkish support for the EU, which 3 years ago was close to 70 percent and is now somewhere between 40 and 50 percent. The EU is very unpopular today in many circles, not just in the AK. The AK has reacted to this decline in public support for the EU.
It is certainly true that Erdogan has been more outspoken and very critical of certain aspects of Israeli policy, but I would remind people also that this is not new, that his predecessor Bulent Ecevit, who was certainly not an Islamist, was critical at times as well. This criticism has not been limited solely to the AK party, although certainly Erdogan has been more outspoken. Although Erdogan has been highly critical of certain aspects of Israeli policy, the substance of the relationship with Israel remains reasonably good. Hence one should differentiate between the rhetoric and the substance--although one could imagine that the substance may eventually begin to be seriously affected as well if the Turkish criticism is continued.
Prof. Barry Rubin: I'll try to sum up. One factor is the growing confidence of the AK doing what it wants to do or what significant parts of the party want to do. They feel more confident. They can pursue their real agenda. A second factor is, one we have long talked about, what would happen if Turkey to some extent gave up on EU membership. That phenomenon may also be happening. Two other things may be shorter-run factors: attitudes towards specific U.S. policies--for example, regarding northern Iraq--and the Gaza war.
However, note the difference between the first two and the last two points. If the latter issues are a large element of the problem, we would expect that within a year, we would see an improvement. But if the main aspect of the problem are the first two points--that is the AK feeling free to do what it wants to do and disillusionment with the European path--to which can be added structural changes in Turkey, this is a long-term, possibly permanent shift. In that case, Turkey would be standing at a historic crossroads.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: Steve, I agree with you on the EU dimension and that its takes two to tango. This is not just the AK not driving the train, but it is also the French parking that train. So absolutely, there are two sides to it.
But we have to differentiate between the front-seat and the back-seat driver in Turkey. Turkey's front seat driver for the last six years now has been the AK; the opposition has been the backseat driver. They are giving the government advice but the government is actually driving the car. It is the people in charge who have decided that they are not going to push aggressively for an EU accession for whatever reason.
It is also the people in charge who have decided that they are going to use a different rhetoric on the Arab-Israeli issue then Turkey has done for the last 60 years. Ecevit has criticized Israel, but never with the language of Erdogan. If you look at the latter's comments for instance that 'Allah will punish Israel' and that he questions Israel's right to be in the UN, and that Hamas should be dealt with as a government, none of this would have come from previous Turkish governments.
So, I am going to suggest to this panel now a new way of thinking about Turkey, and I think this will help us make sense of the change that Turkey is going through. The Islamists in Turkey are no more in opposition. They are in government. The secular Turks are in opposition. When we start thinking of Turkey with this new paradigm it is a country run by what is an Islamist party in the Turkish context. The government controls two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. It has the presidency, the cabinet, and is about to have the power to appoint the judges to the Supreme Court. It controls half of the media. They have a fairly large support base among Turkey's wealthiest people. When talking about political hegemony that is about as good as it gets.
Let us think of this not as the Islamist opposition and secular establishment but as the AK Islamist establishment and the secular opposition.
U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I would try to put the recent deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations in perspective by saying that one of the main reasons for the deterioration is the differences over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but the deterioration has to be seen within the broader context of Turkey's changing security environment. One of the factors was the Cold War's end, which removed the main glue of the bilateral security relationship, the Soviet threat. At the same time, it opened up a number of new opportunities in areas that had been more or less off limits to Turkish policy, particularly Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey now had opportunities that it had not had previously.
Second, the focus of threats and challenges changed quite dramatically. During the Cold War, the main threat was from the north, from the Soviet Union. Today, the main threats and challenges are on Turkey's southern border. That has to do with the disintegration of Iraq, the problems in Lebanon, the problems posed by a potentially nuclear-armed Iran, and the problems that arise in Arab-Israeli disputes. So it is not unusual that Turkey would begin to focus much more heavily on the Middle East and particularly on Iraq.
The differences over Iraq, I would say, are the main--though not the sole--reason for the deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations. From the beginning, the Turkish leadership had reservations about the wisdom of the invasion and made their reservations clear. They did not like Saddam Hussein. They thought he was a brutal dictator just as much as the Bush administration, but they were worried that the invasion would lead to instability on their southern border fragmentation of Iraq, an increase in sectarian violence, and most of all an increase in Kurdish nationalism.
 In fact, their worst fears came true. There was after the invasion a rather large increase for a number of years in sectarian violence. Iran's role in Iraq and in the region has increased and the danger of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state on Turkish borders also has increased.
Finally, the insurgency from the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) was reignited and strengthened. Therefore, if you try to look back at why this deterioration occurred, the fact that the United States was unwilling to assist Turkey in combating PKK terrorism for a number of years was seen in Turkey as hypocritical. After all, the United States had undertaken two military actions--Afghanistan and Iraq--to combat terrorism, and the Turks also saw themselves as faced with a terrorist threat.
I am quite convinced that as the U.S. presence in Iraq draws down, the degree of anti-Americanism will decline. The willingness of the United States to help to combat PKK terrorism, the willingness to provide the Turks with operational intelligence, has already had a positive impact on relations. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic. A number of Obama's likely positions come closer to coinciding with Turkish government policy and interests than those of the Bush administration. If the U.S. government under Obama continues, as I suspect it will, to assist the Turks in combating PKK terrorism, I think there will likely be a gradual improvement of relations.
One of the key issues for the Turkish government will be the impact of a U.S. withdrawal on the Kurdish Regional Government and the Iraqi Kurds. On one hand, one could argue that the United States has been restraining the Kurds and that there is fear in some parts of Turkey that with the U.S. withdrawal the Iraqi Kurds may feel less constrained about declaring independence.
The other side of the coin, however, in my view, is more likely. The impact would be to push the Kurds more toward accommodation with Turkey because they would realize that they were losing their most important patron and needed some replacement. This won't happen overnight, but we are already beginning to see some elements of it.
Still, a lot will depend on what happens with the Armenian Genocide Resolution in the U.S. Congress. If the Congress passes the resolution, it could have a very negative impact on relations.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Basically, the view is that Iraq has been the main issue that has created friction. Do we want to conclude that there are other important issues that should be mentioned? When talking to people in Turkey one hears the idea from the opposition that the United States is really very pro-AK--which is given by the opposition as an excuse for its not doing better.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I do not want to say that Iraq is the overwhelming factor, but it is certainly--and you are correct at that--not the sole factor.
Barry Rubin: Could you mention some secondary factors?
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I would say the differences on policy toward Iran both on the energy issue as well as Turkey's relationship with Iran in general, also with Syria, but you are likely to see a realignment of policy between Turkey and the United States, because the Obama administration is likely to open a dialogue and try to engage with Iran. How successful that will be remains to be seen. The same with Syria, but this opening of a dialogue will mean that U.S. and Turkish policy will now be more in alignment than they were in the past. And there is the Arab-Israeli issue as well. So, there are a number of other issues there have been differences on.
Prof. Efraim Inbar: Basically, Soner pays more attention to identity issues, while Steven Larrabee is more or less talking about realpolitik. What are the main motivations behind the AK's foreign policy? Is it Islamist forces or maybe realpolitik because with the Soviet Union no longer there, they do not need the Americans anymore, and they can dream about playing a central role in the Middle East?
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I think that is a very interesting question. I have to say I am probably somewhere in between. When you listen to the language of Erdogan in particular, not just in talking about Gaza, you really get the sense that this is not a kind of political stretch. This is not a language of convenience or of strategic calculation. It may be all of those things, but it is also how they see the world. It conforms to their worldview.
I think that isn't an unfair characterization of what the AK has been doing, not without some success actually. They now face some much tougher choices because of things happening in the world. They are very reluctant to make those choices, especially if it is a reaffirmation of core, Western institutional ties, NATO, EU, etc. I think it is a mixture of both the personality affinity and identity and these structural problems that is driving us in the direction of exactly what Soner describes, even if I don't agree with every aspect of how you have laid it out. I think, on the whole, the effect is as you have described.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: Let me give you some feedback from my four months of research in Turkey during autumn 2008. One of the questions I had was why do Turks hate America?
I did a test. I turned off CNN and BBC, the Financial Times, and email, and for two weeks I watched only the Turkish media and read only what Turks read. The conclusion is that what Turks hear about the United States, as reported in their media and described to them by the AK government, is an incredibly anti-Western, anti-European, and now anti-Israeli perspective. So your typical Turk does not like the United States, in fact, hates the United States because that is the only thing that he hears.
So Obama might do all the right things to make Turkey happy on Iran, the Armenian resolution, Iraq, the PKK, and the EU, but Turkish opinion will only turn around when the government also tells its people that the United States is a friend of Turkey and that Turkey and the Unites States do share common interests--such as a unified stable Iraq--and values such as democracy. What I say for Turkish-American ties could easily be applied to Turkish-Israeli relations as well.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: Let us come back to this question of identity politics versus realpolitik because I think it is very important. I think what Soner and Ian have said is quite true. Identity politics do play a very important role. It is not just a question of realpolitik. But on the question of U.S.-Turkish relations, I think the main factor--though not the only factor--had to do with the U.S. handling of Iraq. I take very much to heart what Soner said, but when you look at what is being said in Turkey, you have to look at the other parties as well, and they are as bad and in many cases more anti-American. This is a problem that goes across the spectrum and involves a number of other parties, not to excuse the AK for some of the things they have said and done.
TURKEY AND ISRAEL
Prof. Efraim Inbar: We should remember first of all that the type of relationship we see now between Israel and Turkey is rather new. It is a question of 20 years, no more. There are several possible explanations for what we have seen from Erdogan. Part of it is a personal explanation. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Erdogan just a few days before the Gaza operation began. Olmert knew it was going to happen and either didn't tell Erdogan about that or perhaps even implied the opposite. There may be a belief that he was misled--or at least could be accused of conspiring in implementing the operation--and this may have further inflamed the criticism.
A second explanation is of course a realpolitik explanation. The Turks are interested in their status with the Arab and Muslim world. Speaking like this against Israel can be seen simply as rhetoric, a cheap way to make gains. And if this is so, cooler heads may prevail, and business will continue as usual, as we have seen before. After all, the second intifada was a serious test to Turkish-Israeli relations, and they didn't change their policies toward Israel. In fact, now, in comparison to the previous crisis, there is a change for the better--they didn't call back their ambassador as they did in the past.
Moreover, if the Turks really want a role in the Middle East as they claim, they need good relations with Israel. So far, and I am not sure it is not going to change, Israeli-Turkish relations have been along the realpolitik paradigm, basically trying to ignore the differences and to focus on those things important to the defense and security interests of those two countries.
There is a third explanation. Indeed, what we see today is part of Turkey's ongoing identity crisis. We probably see a greater component of Muslim identity, and it influences Turkish foreign policy. Israel is part of this debate.
Israel has always favored good relations with Turkey. There has already been a decline in Israeli tourism to Turkey. In addition, I think there are several tests ahead. What will happen to military relations, to economic relations? I think they may be influenced by the atmosphere in Turkey. At the same time, Israel should try to conduct a dialogue with the Islamists. We are indeed at a crossroads. Turkey, for its own reasons that Israel has no influence over, will show us where it is going.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: If you watch the weather forecast on TRT, Turkey's publicly funded television station, they will never give you the temperature for any Israeli cities, though they do provide the forecast for all cities outside of Israel, despite the fact that there is a large Turkish-speaking community in Israel that might actually be watching this station.
Dr. Anat Lapidot-Firilla: If we are talking about realpolitik, then perhaps we can ask ourselves if Turkey currently sees itself in competition with Israel. If so, as far as evaluating a strategic partnership, we need to come to the conclusion that we are no longer strategic partners, but rather that we stand in opposition due to a conflict of interests.
It is not quite true to say that critical comments about Israel were made by Turkish leaders before. That is not the issue. The issue is that never before did such remarks involve such a systematic campaign and attempt to mobilize Turkish people in an anti-Israel direction. The ruling party and government were very active to ensure a certain view of Israelis and Jews, especially on the part of the younger generation in Turkey. That is why we should notice AK policy. It is not merely the rhetoric of politicians--and this makes me concerned.
Prof. Barry Rubin: I think that we should lay out what is underlying this discussion, which is the Turkish conception of strategy and realpolitik. We are not just dealing with a question of identity but of Turkey's whole orientation. Will it be Islamist or Kemalist? How will Turkey see its regional goals, and in what way will it define its friends and enemies? What is at stake here are not just bilateral relations with Israel or even the United States, but the whole nature of Turkey itself.
If the AK is going to view itself as close to or even aligned to some degree with Iran, Syria, and Hamas--not the Palestinian Authority--that is a hugely changed conception. This does not mean Turkey will not seek good relations with Europe or America, though less likely with Israel, yet it will be a very different Turkey from the one that has existed for a very long time.
In addition, this would mark a significant change in the regional power balance. It is not just, for example, a matter of the Turkish government not worrying about Iran having nuclear weapons, but the regime possibly wants Iran to have nuclear weapons because it sees that as empowering Muslims. This means it is not just sympathetic to Palestinian suffering but that it wants Hamas to take over the Palestinian leadership. It implies that Turkey does not just have problems with the U.S. over Iraq, but would like to see a very different Iraq.
Are they entering into, at least in a loose way, what Syrian President Bashar Asad calls 'the resistance camp' and that whatever they say to keep the EU happy or to avoid friction with the United States, this may be the biggest strategic shift in the Middle East since the Iranian Revolution. I do not want to overstate the case, but here is a piece of evidence. Compared to its warming toward Iran, Syria, and Hamas, we see no equivalent Turkish moves toward Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan--the opponents of the Iranian-led coalition.
Dr. Ian Lesser: The United States and Israel are being affected by something that is happening in Turkey which is not anything new. The AK is a mass party; public opinion counts. There has been a certain distortion in the way the United States sees our own relationship with Turkey. We could go and deal with a very small number of strategic elites, military, and some in the private sector, and they would give us essentially what we wanted out of a realist view of our interest. That has not gone away entirely, but it is getting very rough at the edges, and I think it is affecting both relationships.
When I was in Ankara and Istanbul, taxi drivers were donating a day's salary to a Gaza fund. Every taxi in Ankara had rather appalling photos plastered on the backs of the taxis that had been centrally distributed, but everybody had them. I was in Gaziantep at factories where there were big placards outside talking about Gaza, so this is not something that is being stirred up without there being a constituency. There is really a deep reservoir of public affinity, unease, all of these things, and its affecting both relationships.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: Let me make this suggestion. The U.S.-Turkish relationship would not be facing the problems it has without the Iraq War. The AK has used this to its advantage to boost domestic popularity and realized that it can get away with anti-American rhetoric at home if it sustains good relations with the United States in Iraq, and it worked.
What I see for the Turkish-Israeli relationship is that Hamas is doing to the Turkish-Israeli relationship what the Iraq war has done to the Turkish-American relationship. It is because the AK's sympathies are largely with Hamas as a political party, not with the Palestinians as a whole. And this is not just my own analysis. Prime Minister Erdogan sees Hamas as a party that should be dealt with and should not be isolated. Is Hamas going to disappear? No. Thus, you are going to get an incredible beating of Israel in Turkey through the Hamas factor.
You might still continue to have the Turkish-Israeli military relationship, but all of that will have to be very low key, under the radar, invisible. And I think the mid-term challenge that faces the relationship is, as Ian mentioned, the economic and cultural component of Turkish-Israeli ties. They are very strong, but can you sustain them in a country where Israelis feel physically threatened?
That is why I think eventually that leg is going to come undone when you have Israelis who go to Turkey on vacation, to invest, for conferences and they are not well received. I see a huge number of problems because the AK's sympathies are, in the final analysis, with Hamas; they don't see Hamas as a problem. Turkey invited Hamas to Ankara in 2005, and then suggested it was some kind of exceptional circumstance, but it turned out that Turkey's contacts with Hamas continued and remain strong.
TURKEY AS A MIDDLE EAST POWER
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: At the Kuwait summit, the moderates--including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt--gathered. At the Doha summit were Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Turkey. So to answer Barry's question, that is how the AK positions itself in Arab politics.
Dr. Steven Larrabee: If I could perhaps address Barry's questions, it is not true that the Turkish government does not care about whether or not Iran gets nuclear weapons. It has made it very clear privately and publicly that it opposes the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. Not because Turkey really feels a threat from Iran, but because Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons could stimulate a nuclear arms race in the region and could raise the nuclear issue in Turkey itself.
On Iran, there are a number of differences with the United States. Turkish and U.S. interests do not totally coincide. Turkey needs the United States. It wants to reduce its dependence on Russia by turning to Iran as a source of oil and natural gas.
Second, there is the Kurdish issue on which Iran and Turkey see eye-to-eye. Turkey has national interests that drive it toward an accommodation with Tehran in certain areas. The same is true in the case of Syria. But certainly on the nuclear issue the United States and Turkey see eye-to-eye much more.
Last, I think that what you are seeing is actually a shift in Turkish perspectives on its role in the Middle East. Under Ataturk and for a long time, Turkey tried to stay aloof from the Middle East and concentrated its major efforts on strengthening ties with the West.
Now, for a variety of reasons, including the changing strategic context from the end of the Cold War, many of the problems in the Middle East are on Turkey's southern borders. Turkey is beginning to return to a role that it played historically and traditionally. I would say that the Republican era, particularly under Ataturk, now is much more of an anomaly in terms of Middle East policy and Turkey's returning to a more historic role and trying to play a larger regional role. Islamic politics plays a role here, but, again, I do not think that it is the main driving force directing Turkey in these directions.
Prof. Efraim Inbar: I think the intriguing question is indeed Barry's. We can think of Turkey's view as seeing the Americans declining, for example, with the United States getting out of Iraq. Turkey has aspirations to play a role in the Middle East. They may be lining themselves up with the radicals. They may be weakening Egypt, which has been a competitor for hegemony in the Middle East. They are being pushed more into Middle Eastern politics by geography. A very interesting question will be how it would affect Turkey's policies if the Russians were to come back to the region.
Prof. Ofra Bengio: Indeed, under the AK, relations with the Middle East have changed dramatically in threat perceptions, its role in the region, and its relationship with certain specific countries. Turkey wants to play a pivotal role in the region, which some have called an Ottoman strategy. This strategy is both multilateralist and aimed at avoiding conflict with any neighbor. Turkey can work with the Arab world, the Muslim countries, and Israel as well. I do not think it will have to choose between these categories, and this is an important point.
In this context, Turkey hopes to play the role of mediator, which requires a reasonably good relationship with Israel. By turning Islam into its platform, rather than nationalism, the AK opened the door for a closer alignment with Arab countries and Iran. This was a way to advance its own bid for regional leadership. There is also a domestic component here: the economic crisis within Turkey and the hope to bring Arab financial support and investment.
Relations with Syria have undergone a major transformation, even a revolution. Turkey gave up its support for the PKK; Turkey offered to help Syria escape isolation. In exchange, one could say the competition between Turkey and Syria has been replaced by competition between Turkey and Egypt.
Another change concerns threat perceptions. Worrying about the Kurds is a constant in Turkish policy, but that threat--once linked to Iran and Syria--is now seen as emanating from Iraq. Turkey grappled with this problem of northern Iraq by cooperating with Iran and Syria on this issue. It is, however, vying with Iran for influence inside Iraq itself while also engaging the Kurdish regional government rather than having a conflict with it. Regarding relations with Iran, again we have seen a major change. Turkey no longer views Iran as an ideological threat but wants to engage Iran through negotiation and cooperation.
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Dr. Ian Lesser: I will make three points on this topic. The first is that the question of Turkey's membership in the EU is a fifteen-year project at a minimum. There is no question that the process is troubled on both sides at the moment. In order to get the process with Europe really seriously going again, Turkey has to make some concessions. It is a question of how long it will take Turkey to agree to the conditions necessary to become a member. Some Turks recognize that, but in general that is not what you see in the debate.
If you ask Turks and Europeans whether it is a good idea for Turkey to come into the European Union and whether it is likely to happen, you get an interesting result. In Turkey, most people still think it is a good idea. They see it as leading to prosperity. The numbers have been going down over time, but still many people think it is a good idea. But if you ask if it is likely they say, 'No, it is not going to happen.' The European responses are the exact opposite. Is it a good idea? No. Is it likely to happen? Yes.
Turks are very surprised to hear this result sometimes. You obviously have many people in Europe who do not like the idea but think it is inevitable. Why? It could be that they simply do not feel that they have control over the process. Other enlargements that they didn't think were necessarily such a good idea happened anyway.
You now have key political actors who are not just ambivalent but really against the idea, such as Sarkozy in France and Merkel in Germany. The economic crisis is likely to have an extremely negative effect on already unenthusiastic European views of the costs and advantages of taking in Turkey for EU membership.
If Turkey becomes--and is perceived as becoming--more and more Middle Eastern, that complicates this relationship with Europe. It gets much harder to make the case for Turkish membership. Moreover, given Turkey's other activities, it just reduces the energy and commitment to this European project. There has to be some kind of focus.
Regarding Turkey's EU membership, I don't think you are going to see anything very different from the Obama administration. It will be very committed to promoting Turkey as a member of the EU eventually. What has changed, of course, is that it gets tougher and tougher for us to make the case.
This stance does give the United States a better hearing for its interests in Turkey. But from our point of view, I think our interest is not for Turkey to become a member but for Turkey to continue to converge with Europe in different sectors that are meaningful to us.
Dr. Anat Lapidot-Firilla: We often hear the argument that the process of Turkey moving toward EU membership is more important than the goal of achieving it, but it is a strange argument. After all, it is this process that made Turkey more religious and to a certain extent created the problems we are debating now. Therefore, if there is no happy ending to the process (acceptance to the EU), the process may prove to be is a very negative one.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: You make a very interesting point.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Let us talk in more detail about Anat's point. One aspect of the EU process was to make the army weaker so that it would not have a public role. The process kicked out some of the controls that Ataturk and his successors had put in. Knowing the army is unable to act makes it easier for the AK to go further toward dismantling the republic as it has existed. Earlier in the AK's reign, the EU gave it certain benefits that strengthened its claim to being moderate and successful. So this is a great irony: The membership process was supposed to bring Turkey closer to Europe but in fact ended up pushing Turkey further away from Europe in terms of its norms and internal politics.
Dr. Ian Lesser: In terms of Turkish nationalism, which in my view is just as potent a force affecting U.S. and Israeli relations with Turkey today as Islamism--maybe more--there is a certain artificiality to this process with Europe in which Turkey feels itself continuously disappointed, not taken seriously, and not dealt with in good faith. We can argue whether that is true, but that is how it is seen. There are constantly issues arising where Turkish nationalism is stirred up. And some of this mood at the moment can be attributed to not just what the United States seems to be doing or not doing in Iraq, for example, but also what the EU does. This process issue that you mention becomes part of the substance.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: An important factor not mentioned yet is the shift in the EU's own mood, a kind of enlargement fatigue that goes beyond Turkey. The French and Dutch referendum made clear that there is real concern among the public in most European countries about the process of enlargement, and that has had an impact on the debate in the EU and, thus, on the debate in Turkey. Another thing worth noting is that in the past, EU-Turkish relations have gone up and down, but Turkey could always count on its relationship with the United States when relations with the EU were bad.
This is the first time in my memory that Turkey's relations with the EU and the United States have been simultaneously bad. This has led to a questioning of the relationship with the West, a feeling of greater vulnerability, of nationalism, a sense that Turkey can no longer rely on its traditional allies--not just the EU but also the United States. This has contributed to this more nationalistic mood and, at the same time, the growing sense of vulnerability. So it is a dangerous mixture of factors affecting Turkey's overall relations not simply with the EU but with the West as a whole. This also helps to explain why Turkey has moved toward a somewhat less pro-Western policy.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Aside from disappointments with the United States and Europe, there has also been the failed idea of a Turkic community, of a special relationship with the ex-Soviet republics. That pulled away still another alternative to a Middle East orientation and possibly a trend toward believing that Iran, Syria, and Hamas are the kind of people they want to have as allies.
Remember also that this basic idea was brought up by Erbakan, the Islamist leader and briefly prime minister, out of whose party the AK itself came. He was ridiculed at the time and ended up looking very foolish. To quote an Egyptian proverb, his idea of Turkey aligning with Arab and Muslim states was seen in Turkey as, 'No matter how many zeros you have you still have zero.'
The AK has reintroduced this notion in a more subtle way and it has become a driving force in Turkish strategy and policy. Remember that close Turkish-Israeli relations were based on the fact that Turkey's interests were opposed to those of Iran--because Iran was pushing Islamism--and Syria--because Syria was pushing radicalism and the Kurdish issue. Yet if Turkey reverses direction on these issues, it no longer needs Israel and, to some extent, the regime may feel it no longer needs Europe or America either. The real loser here is not Israel but the United States.
Dr. Ian Lesser: It also threatens to reverse some of the things that have really been very positive in terms of the EU candidacy: the talks with Greece that transcended that old rivalry, for example. A rising mood of nationalism could unravel some of these things that have actually been very positive.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: Certainly, there is a big difference between the AK's policy and that of Erbakan, which was decidedly anti-Western ideologically. The National Salvation Party and Refah were opposed to NATO membership; they were opposed to membership with the EU. What has changed is a number of factors. Iraq has had a deleterious impact on U.S.-Turkish relations, while the changes in the EU have had a deleterious impact on Turkish relations with the EU. There have been changes in Syria since 1998 that were justifiably why Turkey would want to maintain a better relationship with Syria. The same applies to Iran. So you have a change in the strategic context as well as changes within the Islamist movement itself and the victory of modernists within the internal debate.
All of these factors have come together to push Turkey in a slightly different direction that is based on a feeling that Turkey can no longer rely on its traditional allies. This gives this new direction, this effort at rebalancing, a somewhat uncertain and dangerous connotation.
Prof. Barry Rubin: You are 100 percent right about the background but that doesn't change the outcome. The question remains, however, have things passed a certain point? And would even the undoing of certain elements, for example, a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have much effect in moving things back. I am simply raising these issues and asking you to make us all feel better by explaining why this is only temporary.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I think these are the key questions, and this going to be very difficult to answer. My own sense is that if Congress does not pass the Armenian Resolution and the United States and Turkey can begin to move back to a better relationship, that doesn't mean we won't have differences, but again I think the differences over Iran will be mitigated somewhat by the fact that Obama is likely to open a dialogue with Teheran and the same with Syria. We will not be able to put the toothpaste back into the tube completely, but I think we can certainly halt the downward spiral that relations have been on for the past five years.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: I think the EU factor is useful not only because it is about Turkey's transformation, but also because, as Stephen said, it provides us an anchor that could tie Turkey to the West at a time when Turkey's relations with the United States have gone through ups and downs. We should promote it.
We have had some pessimistic conversations about where Turkey is going. Turkey is changing both at home and in foreign policy. I see a slipping away from certain liberal democratic values, from Europe. We need to make sure that the EU process therefore becomes a benchmark for both Turkey's internal process, but also an anchor that ties Turkey to the West. The same points apply to NATO.
*PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES
Dr. Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism. His Ph.D. is from Yale University (2003), and he has taught courses at Yale and Princeton Universities, as well as serving as visiting professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. His latest book is Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? (Routledge, 2006).
Dr. Stephen Larrabee is Distinguished Chair in European Security at RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. He specializes in NATO, Eastern Europe, Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine. He previously served as Vice President and Director of Studies at the Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York. His Ph.D. in political science and international affairs is from Columbia University. He makes frequent media appearances, and writes commentary in the International Herald Tribune; New York Times; United Press International; and Washington Times.
Dr. Ian Lesser is Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States. His expertise includes transatlantic relations, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey. He previously served in the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., where he led a major project on the future of U.S.-Turkish relations. He spent over a decade at RAND as a senior analyst and research manager. From 1994-1995, he was a member of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State. He received his D.Phil. from Oxford University.
Prof. Ofra Bengio is Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, and Senior Lecturer, Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. Her fields of specialization are contemporary Middle Eastern history, modern and contemporary politics of Iraq, and the Arabic language. She is the author of Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (Oxford University Press, 1998); Editor (with Gabriel Ben-Dor) of Minorities and State in the Arab World (Lynne Rienner, 1999); and The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
Prof. Efraim Inbar is a Professor in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. He completed his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago. He served as visiting professor at Johns Hopkins University (2004), at Georgetown University (1991-1992), and visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1996). His area of specialization is Middle Eastern strategic issues with a special interest in the politics and strategy of Israeli national security. His latest book is Israel's National Security: Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War (Routledge, 2008).
Dr. Anat Lapidot-Firilla is a Senior Fellow and the Academic Director of the Mediterranean unit at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. She is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Policy Studies, School of Public Policy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and teaches at the Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies Program at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research focuses on various aspects of religion, politics, and identity with an emphasis on contemporary Turkey.
Prof. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), with Walter Laqueur (Viking-Penguin); the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan); A Chronological History of Terrorism, with Judy Colp Rubin, (Sharpe); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).
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MERIA Journal Staff
Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry Rubin
Assistant Editors: Yeru Aharoni, Anna Melman.
MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University.
Site: http://www.gloria-center.org/ - Email: info@gloria-center.org