Turkish Politicians Comment on Obamas Speech

Istanbul NTV Online 06 Apr 09

Unattributed report: Political Parties Comment on Obamas Speech

The NTV interviewed the representatives of political parties which have a
delegation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly [TBMM] about the speech
delivered by Obama in a plenary session of the TBMM.

Deniz Bolukbasi, a Nationalist Action Party deputy from Ankara: "His
address to the National Assembly should be analyzed in two parts. He said that
Turkey was a critical ally, emphasized secularism and democracy in Turkey, and
noted that this long-standing friendship between Turkey and the United States
based on common values can establish new ground for partnership in order to
overcome new challenge of the world. Those were positive remarks.

"But, I was deeply disappointed and alarmed by the other parts of Obama's
speech. After his meeting with President Gul, he said that his opinion about
genocide had not changed and that the problem could be resolved if the common
border between Armenia and Turkey was reopened and diplomatic relations were
established. He noted that he was encouraging Turkey to take those steps. He
referred to the possibility of reopening the Heybeliada seminary. He said that
Turkey should cooperate with the Barzani Administration while reiterating
support for granting Kurdish rights and fighting against terrorism. I was not
expecting the US President to make those comments. The speech, therefore, had
certain aspects which gave rise to concerns.  

"He stated that they would support Turkey in its fight against the PKK and
that the United States was also regarding the PKK as a terrorist organization.
But, it was not sufficient. He stated that Turkey should also build ties of
cooperation with the central government and Kurdish leaders in Iraq. In other
words, he implied that the problem should be discussed with Barzani in order to
find a solution.

"He said that Turkey was at the heart of a region where East and West unite
come together rather than being divided, adding that different cultures could
live together, citing relations between Turkey and the United States as an
example. He said that they were not waging and would never wage war against
the Muslim world. But, his speech did not have a context indicating that
Turkey has assumed a special mission in that regard."

Suat Kiniklioglu, deputy head of the AKP's [Justice and Development Party]
foreign affairs committee: "I think it was an encouraging speech, albeit it
was short. But, it contained important messages. Firstly, there was special
emphasis laid on Turkey's European identity and relations with the EU. He
expressed his desire to understand the Muslim world better and to establish
closer ties with it which reflected his commitment to maintaining good
relations with the Muslim world.

"The reference to the Cyprus question was of crucial importance to us
because talks in Cyprus presently continue and they are very important. He
said that both sides should take a constructive approach to the negotiations. 
His desire to mend Turkish-American relations was clearly demonstrated. Before
the presidential election, Obama said that he would pursue such a policy and
that he would make serious efforts in order to get Turkish-American relations
back on the rails. I think that he reiterated his determination in his address
to the National Assembly. It was actually a response to the comment made by
French President Sarkozy to a certain extent.

"He said: 'The United States is not a member of the EU, but it is an ally
of both the EU and Turkey. So, there are things that it can say.' It was
generally very positive. Clearly, I regard it as a speech which gave clues
about the next period in Turkish-American relations.

As regards the seminary issue, you know that it is a matter which are
constantly brought up by foreign visitors, but has not been actually explained
due to some difficulties peculiar to Turkey. Regarding the events witnessed in
1915, Obama made frequent references to the United States' own history and
slavery. He said that people who looked like him could not even vote much less
being the president of the United States because of their skin in the past. It
was interesting to hear him making such an analogy and first mentioned US
history and made references to Turkey about the issue. As our President noted
in a news conference at the Presidential Mansion today, we have already said
that a history committee should be established, there are conflicting
information, and that we are open to the idea of setting up a history committee
about a contentious historical issue.

"Obviously, I do not know what the public will think about it, but there was
a certain level of silence in the National Assembly during that part of his
speech. I think the public will make its own judgment about the issue. But,
the AKP has already given its response by our leader's proposal to set up a
history committee in 2005 which was discussed during recent rapprochement
between Turkey and Armenia more recently."

Ahmet Tan, Democratic Left Party deputy from Istanbul: "When I take a look
from the tunnel of history -- because I also listened to Clinton on 15 November
1999 -- I do not think that there is a black-and-white contrast between the two
speeches. But, there are differences regarding certain issues. Clinton
mentioned Cyprus because of conditions prevailing back then. But, Obama made
no reference to Cyprus.

Clinton talked about conflicts in the Aegean and he used the term conflict
because we had problems with Greece back then. Of course this was not the case
this time. Obama delivered a speech which was at a higher level. In a sense,
it was reminiscent of the speech he made in front of the White House on the day
he was elected.

"The section about the Armenian issue deserves Turkey's special attention. 
Clinton made no reference to the Armenian issue back then. But, Obama did. 
But, he did it in a very careful and diplomatic manner. He implied that we
should face up to tragic events of the past. Of course it was not a comment
that would make the Armenian community in the United States very happy because
he used the term 'Armenian genocide" during his campaign. All supporters of
the allegation of Armenian genocide and diaspora Armenians were definitely
expecting him to use the word 'genocide.' But, he did not use it. In a sense,
it was good because it was parallel with both messages of peace and advice to
refrain from conflicts. I was surprised to hear him laying emphasis on
reopening the seminary in Istanbul which indicated that it will remain n the
agenda in the future.

"There were also other differences between them in terms of respective
periods. Energy was not on the agenda during that period. He commented on
energy in addition to the Kurdish overture, particularly TRT 6 television
channel. His remarks about torture were of great importance. He has more
dynamic expectations about democratic overtures. He said: 'Democracy is a
dynamic process." He laid particular emphasis on freedom of the media which was
related to the government's policies. In my view, this is one of the
conclusions that should be drawn by the ruling party."

Republican People's Party deputy leader Onur Oymen: "He gave very positive
messages. In fact, it was broadly not much different those we were expecting
to hear. There are several points which deserve special attention. Firstly,
he referred to democratic secularism. He praised Ataturk's legacy and stressed
the notion of democratic secularism. This is the first important element.

"The second important element is that he said that close cooperation between
Turkey and the United States was needed. He referred to common factors, but we
did not hear him uttering the term 'strategic partnership.' This was the main
difference with the Bush Administration. By saying that we should normalize
our relations with Armenia, he implied that we should reopen the common
border. What he said about Heybeliada represented messages that we already
knew of.

But, he did not mention why Turkey has kept its border with Armenia closed
for such a long period? The reason is that 20 percent of Azeri territory has
been invaded by Armenia. The message that Turkey should reopen the border even
if Armenia does not withdraw from that region can be interpreted as a piece of
advice implying that we should accept the current situation. But, he did not
precisely imply that. He said that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which has
been continuing for a long time should be resolved. 

"Thus, he gave both messages concurrently. He referred to both sides in
Cyprus while emphasizing the need to unite. He used a very general term. One
of his important messages was about the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. He gave
the message that there should be two states which is an opinion that we are
advocating. While making comments on Iraq and the PKK, he emphasized the fight
on terror which was of crucial importance. But, he did not give any signal
about how the PKK would be expelled from northern Iraq. 

He said that terrorism is a threat to Turkey, Iraq, and the United States. 
How are we going to fight against that threat? We could not fully see a sign. 
We are awaiting it. He said: 'We will work together in Afghanistan." What did
he actually mean? Did he imply that they would fight against terrorism in
Afghanistan together with Turkish troops? It was not clear.

In other words, his general messages were positive and friendly. But, we
will analyze his speech in detail. His meeting with our leader and taking care
to meet with the leaders of the opposition parties are very positive signs. It
showed that the new US government is perfectly aware that Turkey does not only
consist of the ruling party.

Democratic Society Party, DTP, leader Ahmet Turk: DTP leader Turk briefed
reporters after his meeting with US President Obama. In reply to a question
how he interpreted Obama's messages and his statement that the PKK is a
terrorist organization during his address to the TBMM, Turk: "We should go
down to the source of violence. I tried to explain that it should not be
regarded as one-sided violence given that there are 17,000 unsolved
murders."

Asked whether or not they were asked to sever their ties with the PKK, Turk
responded that there was no such discussion.  

Does Turkey Still Belong in NATO?

by Daniel Pipes
Philadelphia Bulletin

April 6, 2009 

Smack on its 60th anniversary, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization finds itself facing a completely novel problem – that of radical Islam, as represented by the Republic of Turkey, within its own ranks.

Ankara joined NATO in 1951 and shortly after Turkish forces fought valiantly with the allies in Korea. Turks stood tough against the Soviet Union for decades. Following the United States, Turkey has the second-largest number of troops in the alliance.
With the end of the Cold War, NATO's mission changed and some saw Islamism as the new strategic enemy. Already in 1995, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes compared Islamism to the historic foe: "Fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as communism was." With the Cold War over, he added, "Islamic militancy has emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to the NATO alliance and to Western security."
Indeed, NATO first invoked Article 5 of its charter, calling on "collective self-defense," to go to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, responding to the 9/11 attacks launched from that country.
More recently, former Spanish prime minister José María Aznar argues that "Islamist terrorism is a new shared threat of a global nature that places the very existence of NATO's members at risk" and advocates that the alliance focus on combating "Islamic jihadism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." He calls for "placing the war against Islamic jihadism at the center of the Allied strategy."
Claes and Aznar are right; but their vision is now in jeopardy, for Islamists have penetrated the 28-state alliance, as was dramatically illustrated in recent days.
 
Prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (left) and Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2002.
 
As the term of Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer concludes in July, a consensus had emerged to make Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 56, his successor. But Fogh Rasmussen was in office in early 2006, when the Muhammad cartoon crisis erupted and he insisted that as prime minister he had no authority to tell a private newspaper what not to publish. This position won him much criticism from Muslims, including Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who instructed Fogh Rasmussen at the time that "Freedoms have limits, what is sacred should be respected."
When Fogh Rasmussen came up for the NATO post, Erdoğan continued his grudge, saying that his government looks "negatively" on Fogh Rasmussen's candidacy because, Erdoğan explained, "I asked for a meeting of Islamic leaders in his country to explain what is going on and he refrained from doing that. So how can I expect him to contribute to peace?"
Eventually, Fogh Rasmussen was selected as the consensus candidate, but at a steep price. The Dane won the job only after engaging in intensive negotiations with Turkish president Abdullah Gül hosted by Barack Obama. Fogh Rasmussen promised to appoint at least two Turks and publicly to address Muslim concerns about his response to the cartoons. More broadly, Erdoğan announced. Obama "gave us guarantees" concerning Turkish reservations about Fogh Rasmussen.
The hoops that Fogh Rasmussen had to jump through to win Ankara's support can be inferred from his cringe-inducing, dhimmi-like remarks on winning the appointment: "As secretary general of NATO, I will make a very clear outreach to the Muslim world to ensure cooperation and intensify dialogue with the Muslim world. I consider Turkey a very important ally and strategic partner and I will cooperate with them in our endeavors to ensure the best cooperation with Muslim world."
We appear to be witnessing the emergence not of a robust NATO following the Claes-Aznar model, one leading the fight against radical Islam, but an institution hobbled from within, incapable of standing up to the main strategic threat for fear of offending a member government.
Nor is Islamism NATO's only problem with Turkey. In what is emerging as a Middle Eastern cold war, with Tehran leading one faction and Riyadh the other, Ankara has repeatedly sided with the former – hosting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, advocating for Iran's nuclear program, developing an Iranian oil field, transferring Iranian arms to Hezbollah, openly supporting Hamas, viciously condemning Israel, and turning Turkish public opinion against the United States.
Noting these changes, columnist Caroline Glick urges Washington to "float the notion of removing Turkey from NATO." The Obama administration is not about to do that; but before Ankara renders NATO toothless, dispassionate observers should carefully think this argument through.

Middle East Forum

MEETING OF ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH BARTHOLOMEW WITH PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

– His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew had a private meeting today with President Barack Obama. The meeting took place at the Conrad Hotel in Constantinople (modern day Istanbul) at approximately 9:45 in the morning. His Eminence Archbishop Demetrios of America and the White House Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, were present at the meeting.

 

 The meeting and ensuing discussion were marked by a spirit of warm cordiality and mutual respect. The substance of the discussions included President Obama’s mention of the issue of the Theological School of Halki in his speech before the Turkish Parliament, and his further discussion of the same with the President of the Turkish Republic, Abdullah Gul. The President said that he would follow up on the issue with a view to a favorable solution for the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  

 

  His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew made reference to the following points:  

 
He made a convincing and passionate argument for the speedy re-opening of the Theological School of Halki, a basic need for the education and preparation of Clergy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  
He emphasized the importance of religious liberty and the guarantee of same for all minorities of Turkey. 
He stated his well-known and long time support for the efforts of Turkey to join the European Union. 
He noted the significance of efforts made on behalf of the environment, adding information on his own upcoming Ecological Symposium in the U.S.A. (Mississippi River) in October of 2009. 
He thanked President Obama for this meeting and for his active interest in the pressing issues of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 

 

His All Holiness mentioned that he had sent to the President, through the local U.S. General Counsel, an icon of the Prophet Baruch (patron of the President) with a handwritten inscription. He also congratulated the President for the championship victory of the University of North Carolina’s Basketball Team, which the President had chosen to win.

Κ. Βοσπορίτης, ο νεώτερος

Π α ρ α τ η ρ η τ ή ρ ι ο Τ ο υ ρ κ ί α ς

Turkey’s Secret Power Brokers

The Islamists aren't getting rid of Turkey's shady Deep State, but replacing it with one of their own.
By Soner Cagaptay | NEWSWEEK

Published Mar 21, 2009

Conspiracy theories have been popular in the former Ottoman Empire ever since the 19th century, when Turkey became a pawn in Great Power games. But even by that standard, the current stories swirling around Istanbul and Ankara take the cake. Tales of a sinister "Deep State" (Derin Devlet) have surfaced in a recent court case alleging that underneath Turkey's modern democracy lies a powerful but invisible security and bureaucratic establishment that is plotting to undermine the elected government.

The charges have arisen in a case known as Ergenekon. According to government prosecutors, the Deep State, identified as a group of judges, journalists, union leaders, artists and retired military officers, were plotting a coup against the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). The court papers say these secular nationalists were also, implausibly, planning Islamist, Marxist and pro-Kurdish terror attacks—all at the same time. In any other Western society, such incoherent accusations would be dismissed as fantasy. In Turkey, they've gained traction, for the simple reason that the country has long had a dominant security clique. Yet what the current rumors miss is that that power base has been broken up in recent years. Today it's the Islamists who are pulling the strings.

The old Deep State surfaced at various times in Turkey's history, stepping in to remove elected governments that strayed too far from the secular legacy of Kemal Atatürk, modern Turkey's founder. The sometimes corrupt and cozy links built by this establishment came to light most spectacularly in 1996, when an unlikely foursome—a politician, a police chief, a beauty queen and a drug lord—got into a car accident. Only the politician survived, and the ensuing embarrassing press coverage allowed Turkey's increasingly robust middle class to push back against this corrupt elite that had long limited their freedoms.


The Deep State was further weakened by the European Union accession process, which began soon after. In 1999, the EU decided to consider Turkey's candidacy—but only if Ankara improved civil liberties, weakened the military's role in politics and consolidated the country's democracy. Then, in 2002, the AKP came to power. At first it seemed to abandon its Islamist roots and embrace EU accession in order to win liberal support. Many Turkish democrats hoped the AKP would eliminate the Deep State once and for all and threw their support behind the party.

Yet in the seven years since, rather than get rid of the shadowy power brokers, the AKP has used cases like Ergenekon—which seems to have involved a genuine plot to overthrow the government—to attack Turkey's secular judges, media, its military and practically any political opponents. The police have taken more than 100 supposed plotters into custody, including not just underworld figures, but also journalists, military officers, businesspeople, judges and academics. Political opponents of the AKP have been pulled out of bed in the early morning hours, only to be released after three days of harsh police questioning. Unsurprisingly, many of these "suspects" have subsequently become much more docile.

Lest there be any doubt about the absurdity of some of the government's claims, consider: the Ergenekon case is based in part on the testimony of one Tuncay Guney, who claims to be a former Turkish intelligence officer now living in exile in Canada—where he says he's become a Hasidic rabbi. Never mind the fact that the Toronto Jewish community says Guney is neither a rabbi nor even Jewish; his assumed identity fits neatly into the anti-Semitism of Turkey's Islamists, who like to portray Jews as a nefarious influence in their country. Some of the allegations are also wildly contradictory. For example, prosecutors claim that Ergenekon plotters were backed by Washington. Yet they also say they planned to attack NATO installations in Turkey.

The tragedy here is that the AKP is not just using Ergenekon to rid Turkey of the old Deep State, but to intimidate its legitimate opposition ahead of nationwide local elections on March 29. As the last elections suggested, more than half the population still opposes the AKP, but many are now afraid to speak out due to signs that the government is monitoring its enemies. Journalists critical of the government have had embarrassing personal conversations leaked to pro-AKP media, and the police have recorded more than 1.5 million phone calls and e-mails in the Ergenekon case alone.

Such signs suggest that the AKP has replaced the old Deep State with a new one of its own. While still using the ghost of the previous establishment to conduct a witch hunt, now the Islamists are pulling the levers of power. The Deep State may have once functioned to intimidate communists and Islamists, but today it is used against secular, liberal and nationalist Turks in order to crush dissent. Turkey's progressives must be heartbroken. They hoped that political modernization and the AKP would finally rid their state of conspiracy theories and shadowy powers behind the throne. But such a change would have required a liberal party at the country's helm.

Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of "Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?"

WHERE IS TURKEY GOING AND WHY?: A PANEL DISCUSSION

Panel Discussion
On January 22, 2009, the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, the U.S. Department of State's International Information Programs in Washington D.C., and the Public Affairs Office at the U.S. Embassy in Israel jointly held an international videoconference seminar focusing on recent changes in Turkish politics and foreign policy. The discussion has been updated and edited.
Brief biographies of the participants can be found at the end of the article. This seminar is part of the GLORIA Center's Experts Forum series.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Turkey is always interesting, always important, but right now it is even more interesting and more important. The question is the country's direction. The current regime, which has been in power long enough and has won enough elections by large margins, is getting more confident. It is doing what it wants, rather than being restrained by fear that if it were to go too far toward Islamic, or Islamist, policies it would alienate the voters. Clearly we have seen the regime move toward Iran and Syria, and away from the United States and Israel. The European Union (EU) seems no closer to admitting Turkey, a source of frustration for Turkey and a process likely to be made more difficult by the government's behavior. Let me stress that the issues here involve not only foreign policy but the Justice and Development (AK) party's systematic effort to gain what seems to be intended as an irreversible hegemony over Turkish politics and society.
HOW HAS TURKEY CHANGED?
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: I think Turkey is changing and has changed on four levels. The first is the erosion of certain liberal democratic values, such as media freedom and gender equality, especially gender equality. For example, in government employment, the number of women in high-level positions is decreasing. As for the media, about half is now owned by the government or by pro-government interests, far more than a few years ago. One part of the media continues with fairly reasonable journalistic standards on issues, while the other half follows the government line. The weakening of such institutions and values is an important element in undermining democracy.
The second area of change is Turkey's relations with the EU. We were all very excited when accession talks with the EU began. Now this train is stalled, and there are several factors to blame for it. The French have objected to it, the Greek Cypriots have provided the alibi, the Austrians don't want Turkey, but the government of Turkey as well has not been pushing for reforms or making them the main focus of its agenda. For instance, in 2005, Turkey started the talks with the EU. That was the year we really saw the dream of Europe and Turkey come close to being a reality. But in 2005, the AK government declared it was not the year of Europe, but the year of Africa. So how serious are they in this regard?
If the process has now come to an almost complete halt, there is also an aspect of domestic politics, and we should all question to what extent the AK is committed to Turkey's accession. After all, it would have to go through a politically costly set of reforms that it is not interested in pursuing because these would cost it domestic popularity.
Third, is Turkey's lower commitment to Turkey's traditional Western alliances, including, for example, Turkey's position on Iran, which is weaker than even before. Whereas Turkey's position until recently was that it did not object to Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in December 2008, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in Washington, he gave a speech saying that countries that objected to Iran's nuclear weapons should themselves not have nuclear weapons. The country has thus moved further from the U.S. position.
Turkey's position on Israel is another example of this phenomenon. Typically, Turkey would have responded to Israel's military operations in Gaza by urging restraint on both sides and hoping the hostilities would end quickly. Yet this was the first time Turkey departed from its established policy and basically bashed Israel for violence without putting any blame on Hamas for rocket attacks before or during the incursion. The government spoke as if Israel had caused the war and would keep causing war.
Fourth, there are powerfully negative public attitudes in Turkey toward the United States and Israel. Opinion polls show that the United States always ranks in the lower teens. Perhaps this will change with the Obama administration, but it will go back down pretty soon, when Turks realize that Obama is going to oppose Iran's nuclear weapons drive and is not going to change U.S. policy significantly. Regarding Israel, popular attitudes are even more negative, in the single digits. This situation has even led to antisemitic incidents in Turkey, a shocking and shaming development in my view in a country that has for 500 years provided a safe haven for Jews. That tradition seems to be eroded right now and is changing in front of our very eyes.
Why should all this matter to those outside Turkey? After all, it could be argued that Turkey's stance on certain issues--Iraq, Afghanistan, and al-Qa'ida--meet U.S. or Western needs. I think we should be concerned about these four elements of change for the following reasons:
Among the 57 countries that are members to the Organization of Islamic Countries, what makes Turkey unique? It is because it is a Muslim country a) which is a secular democracy; b) is in accession talks with the EU; c) is a NATO member; and d) has normal relations with Israel. You cannot find any other predominantly Muslim country with any of these characteristics.
Yet on all four of these aspects, we are seeing Turkey's uniqueness coming undone; there are even issues with NATO. My sense and predication is that in the short term, the Turkish-Israeli relationship will go into a low profile phase where, as Barry said, objectively, military, security, and intelligence operations will continue but will not be spoken about. But if the persisting problem of a government not crazy about this relationship and a public that opposes the relationship is not addressed in Turkey then the relationship will decline. In a democracy, popular opinion eventually shapes foreign policy. If anti-Israeli views persist in Turkey, and the relationship loses its public/economic component, which acts as a shock absorber, sooner or later, public opinion will shape, trim, and erode the Turkish-Israeli relationship.
Dr. Ian Lesser: One of the things I find very striking in Turkey is the steady deterioration of views about the West, Europe, Israel, and the United States. The secular opposition and the military and security establishment were traditionally very NATO- focused. These are now hotbeds of nationalism. I just came back from Turkey and strong language about Gaza wasn't just coming from the AK party, it was also coming from the nationalist opposition, secular leftist, and secular rightists.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I found the discussion a little bit one-sided. While it is true that there has been growing anti-Americanism, or anti-Bushism, I would argue strongly that the more nationalistic, more anti-American party is the CHP (Republican People's Party), partly because it is in opposition. When you look across the spectrum, it is not the AK that is the most anti-American. Similarly, when you look at the question of the EU, yes, there has been a slowdown in reform and it is regrettable and very troubling.
On the other hand, you need to look also at the EU's behavior. Two of the main members, France and Germany, have essentially walked away from the basic principles of the EU accession negotiations and now are trying to talk about a privileged partnership. The EU has not lived up to its original agreement to lift the trade embargo against northern Cyprus. All these developments have led to a decline in Turkish support for the EU, which 3 years ago was close to 70 percent and is now somewhere between 40 and 50 percent. The EU is very unpopular today in many circles, not just in the AK. The AK has reacted to this decline in public support for the EU.
It is certainly true that Erdogan has been more outspoken and very critical of certain aspects of Israeli policy, but I would remind people also that this is not new, that his predecessor Bulent Ecevit, who was certainly not an Islamist, was critical at times as well. This criticism has not been limited solely to the AK party, although certainly Erdogan has been more outspoken. Although Erdogan has been highly critical of certain aspects of Israeli policy, the substance of the relationship with Israel remains reasonably good. Hence one should differentiate between the rhetoric and the substance--although one could imagine that the substance may eventually begin to be seriously affected as well if the Turkish criticism is continued.
Prof. Barry Rubin: I'll try to sum up. One factor is the growing confidence of the AK doing what it wants to do or what significant parts of the party want to do. They feel more confident. They can pursue their real agenda. A second factor is, one we have long talked about, what would happen if Turkey to some extent gave up on EU membership. That phenomenon may also be happening. Two other things may be shorter-run factors: attitudes towards specific U.S. policies--for example, regarding northern Iraq--and the Gaza war.
However, note the difference between the first two and the last two points. If the latter issues are a large element of the problem, we would expect that within a year, we would see an improvement. But if the main aspect of the problem are the first two points--that is the AK feeling free to do what it wants to do and disillusionment with the European path--to which can be added structural changes in Turkey, this is a long-term, possibly permanent shift. In that case, Turkey would be standing at a historic crossroads.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: Steve, I agree with you on the EU dimension and that its takes two to tango. This is not just the AK not driving the train, but it is also the French parking that train. So absolutely, there are two sides to it.
But we have to differentiate between the front-seat and the back-seat driver in Turkey. Turkey's front seat driver for the last six years now has been the AK; the opposition has been the backseat driver. They are giving the government advice but the government is actually driving the car. It is the people in charge who have decided that they are not going to push aggressively for an EU accession for whatever reason.
It is also the people in charge who have decided that they are going to use a different rhetoric on the Arab-Israeli issue then Turkey has done for the last 60 years. Ecevit has criticized Israel, but never with the language of Erdogan. If you look at the latter's comments for instance that 'Allah will punish Israel' and that he questions Israel's right to be in the UN, and that Hamas should be dealt with as a government, none of this would have come from previous Turkish governments.
So, I am going to suggest to this panel now a new way of thinking about Turkey, and I think this will help us make sense of the change that Turkey is going through. The Islamists in Turkey are no more in opposition. They are in government. The secular Turks are in opposition. When we start thinking of Turkey with this new paradigm it is a country run by what is an Islamist party in the Turkish context. The government controls two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. It has the presidency, the cabinet, and is about to have the power to appoint the judges to the Supreme Court. It controls half of the media. They have a fairly large support base among Turkey's wealthiest people. When talking about political hegemony that is about as good as it gets.
Let us think of this not as the Islamist opposition and secular establishment but as the AK Islamist establishment and the secular opposition.
U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I would try to put the recent deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations in perspective by saying that one of the main reasons for the deterioration is the differences over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but the deterioration has to be seen within the broader context of Turkey's changing security environment. One of the factors was the Cold War's end, which removed the main glue of the bilateral security relationship, the Soviet threat. At the same time, it opened up a number of new opportunities in areas that had been more or less off limits to Turkish policy, particularly Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey now had opportunities that it had not had previously.
Second, the focus of threats and challenges changed quite dramatically. During the Cold War, the main threat was from the north, from the Soviet Union. Today, the main threats and challenges are on Turkey's southern border. That has to do with the disintegration of Iraq, the problems in Lebanon, the problems posed by a potentially nuclear-armed Iran, and the problems that arise in Arab-Israeli disputes. So it is not unusual that Turkey would begin to focus much more heavily on the Middle East and particularly on Iraq.
The differences over Iraq, I would say, are the main--though not the sole--reason for the deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations. From the beginning, the Turkish leadership had reservations about the wisdom of the invasion and made their reservations clear. They did not like Saddam Hussein. They thought he was a brutal dictator just as much as the Bush administration, but they were worried that the invasion would lead to instability on their southern border fragmentation of Iraq, an increase in sectarian violence, and most of all an increase in Kurdish nationalism.
 In fact, their worst fears came true. There was after the invasion a rather large increase for a number of years in sectarian violence. Iran's role in Iraq and in the region has increased and the danger of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state on Turkish borders also has increased.
Finally, the insurgency from the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) was reignited and strengthened. Therefore, if you try to look back at why this deterioration occurred, the fact that the United States was unwilling to assist Turkey in combating PKK terrorism for a number of years was seen in Turkey as hypocritical. After all, the United States had undertaken two military actions--Afghanistan and Iraq--to combat terrorism, and the Turks also saw themselves as faced with a terrorist threat.
I am quite convinced that as the U.S. presence in Iraq draws down, the degree of anti-Americanism will decline. The willingness of the United States to help to combat PKK terrorism, the willingness to provide the Turks with operational intelligence, has already had a positive impact on relations. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic. A number of Obama's likely positions come closer to coinciding with Turkish government policy and interests than those of the Bush administration. If the U.S. government under Obama continues, as I suspect it will, to assist the Turks in combating PKK terrorism, I think there will likely be a gradual improvement of relations.
One of the key issues for the Turkish government will be the impact of a U.S. withdrawal on the Kurdish Regional Government and the Iraqi Kurds. On one hand, one could argue that the United States has been restraining the Kurds and that there is fear in some parts of Turkey that with the U.S. withdrawal the Iraqi Kurds may feel less constrained about declaring independence.
The other side of the coin, however, in my view, is more likely. The impact would be to push the Kurds more toward accommodation with Turkey because they would realize that they were losing their most important patron and needed some replacement. This won't happen overnight, but we are already beginning to see some elements of it.
Still, a lot will depend on what happens with the Armenian Genocide Resolution in the U.S. Congress. If the Congress passes the resolution, it could have a very negative impact on relations.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Basically, the view is that Iraq has been the main issue that has created friction. Do we want to conclude that there are other important issues that should be mentioned? When talking to people in Turkey one hears the idea from the opposition that the United States is really very pro-AK--which is given by the opposition as an excuse for its not doing better.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I do not want to say that Iraq is the overwhelming factor, but it is certainly--and you are correct at that--not the sole factor.
Barry Rubin: Could you mention some secondary factors?
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I would say the differences on policy toward Iran both on the energy issue as well as Turkey's relationship with Iran in general, also with Syria, but you are likely to see a realignment of policy between Turkey and the United States, because the Obama administration is likely to open a dialogue and try to engage with Iran. How successful that will be remains to be seen. The same with Syria, but this opening of a dialogue will mean that U.S. and Turkish policy will now be more in alignment than they were in the past. And there is the Arab-Israeli issue as well. So, there are a number of other issues there have been differences on.
Prof. Efraim Inbar: Basically, Soner pays more attention to identity issues, while Steven Larrabee is more or less talking about realpolitik. What are the main motivations behind the AK's foreign policy? Is it Islamist forces or maybe realpolitik because with the Soviet Union no longer there, they do not need the Americans anymore, and they can dream about playing a central role in the Middle East?
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I think that is a very interesting question. I have to say I am probably somewhere in between. When you listen to the language of Erdogan in particular, not just in talking about Gaza, you really get the sense that this is not a kind of political stretch. This is not a language of convenience or of strategic calculation. It may be all of those things, but it is also how they see the world. It conforms to their worldview.
I think that isn't an unfair characterization of what the AK has been doing, not without some success actually. They now face some much tougher choices because of things happening in the world. They are very reluctant to make those choices, especially if it is a reaffirmation of core, Western institutional ties, NATO, EU, etc. I think it is a mixture of both the personality affinity and identity and these structural problems that is driving us in the direction of exactly what Soner describes, even if I don't agree with every aspect of how you have laid it out. I think, on the whole, the effect is as you have described.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: Let me give you some feedback from my four months of research in Turkey during autumn 2008. One of the questions I had was why do Turks hate America?
I did a test. I turned off CNN and BBC, the Financial Times, and email, and for two weeks I watched only the Turkish media and read only what Turks read. The conclusion is that what Turks hear about the United States, as reported in their media and described to them by the AK government, is an incredibly anti-Western, anti-European, and now anti-Israeli perspective. So your typical Turk does not like the United States, in fact, hates the United States because that is the only thing that he hears.
So Obama might do all the right things to make Turkey happy on Iran, the Armenian resolution, Iraq, the PKK, and the EU, but Turkish opinion will only turn around when the government also tells its people that the United States is a friend of Turkey and that Turkey and the Unites States do share common interests--such as a unified stable Iraq--and values such as democracy. What I say for Turkish-American ties could easily be applied to Turkish-Israeli relations as well.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: Let us come back to this question of identity politics versus realpolitik because I think it is very important. I think what Soner and Ian have said is quite true. Identity politics do play a very important role. It is not just a question of realpolitik. But on the question of U.S.-Turkish relations, I think the main factor--though not the only factor--had to do with the U.S. handling of Iraq. I take very much to heart what Soner said, but when you look at what is being said in Turkey, you have to look at the other parties as well, and they are as bad and in many cases more anti-American. This is a problem that goes across the spectrum and involves a number of other parties, not to excuse the AK for some of the things they have said and done.
TURKEY AND ISRAEL
Prof. Efraim Inbar: We should remember first of all that the type of relationship we see now between Israel and Turkey is rather new. It is a question of 20 years, no more. There are several possible explanations for what we have seen from Erdogan. Part of it is a personal explanation. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Erdogan just a few days before the Gaza operation began. Olmert knew it was going to happen and either didn't tell Erdogan about that or perhaps even implied the opposite. There may be a belief that he was misled--or at least could be accused of conspiring in implementing the operation--and this may have further inflamed the criticism.
A second explanation is of course a realpolitik explanation. The Turks are interested in their status with the Arab and Muslim world. Speaking like this against Israel can be seen simply as rhetoric, a cheap way to make gains. And if this is so, cooler heads may prevail, and business will continue as usual, as we have seen before. After all, the second intifada was a serious test to Turkish-Israeli relations, and they didn't change their policies toward Israel. In fact, now, in comparison to the previous crisis, there is a change for the better--they didn't call back their ambassador as they did in the past.
Moreover, if the Turks really want a role in the Middle East as they claim, they need good relations with Israel. So far, and I am not sure it is not going to change, Israeli-Turkish relations have been along the realpolitik paradigm, basically trying to ignore the differences and to focus on those things important to the defense and security interests of those two countries.
There is a third explanation. Indeed, what we see today is part of Turkey's ongoing identity crisis. We probably see a greater component of Muslim identity, and it influences Turkish foreign policy. Israel is part of this debate.
Israel has always favored good relations with Turkey. There has already been a decline in Israeli tourism to Turkey. In addition, I think there are several tests ahead. What will happen to military relations, to economic relations? I think they may be influenced by the atmosphere in Turkey. At the same time, Israel should try to conduct a dialogue with the Islamists. We are indeed at a crossroads. Turkey, for its own reasons that Israel has no influence over, will show us where it is going.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: If you watch the weather forecast on TRT, Turkey's publicly funded television station, they will never give you the temperature for any Israeli cities, though they do provide the forecast for all cities outside of Israel, despite the fact that there is a large Turkish-speaking community in Israel that might actually be watching this station.
Dr. Anat Lapidot-Firilla: If we are talking about realpolitik, then perhaps we can ask ourselves if Turkey currently sees itself in competition with Israel. If so, as far as evaluating a strategic partnership, we need to come to the conclusion that we are no longer strategic partners, but rather that we stand in opposition due to a conflict of interests.
It is not quite true to say that critical comments about Israel were made by Turkish leaders before. That is not the issue. The issue is that never before did such remarks involve such a systematic campaign and attempt to mobilize Turkish people in an anti-Israel direction. The ruling party and government were very active to ensure a certain view of Israelis and Jews, especially on the part of the younger generation in Turkey. That is why we should notice AK policy. It is not merely the rhetoric of politicians--and this makes me concerned.
Prof. Barry Rubin: I think that we should lay out what is underlying this discussion, which is the Turkish conception of strategy and realpolitik. We are not just dealing with a question of identity but of Turkey's whole orientation. Will it be Islamist or Kemalist? How will Turkey see its regional goals, and in what way will it define its friends and enemies? What is at stake here are not just bilateral relations with Israel or even the United States, but the whole nature of Turkey itself.
If the AK is going to view itself as close to or even aligned to some degree with Iran, Syria, and Hamas--not the Palestinian Authority--that is a hugely changed conception. This does not mean Turkey will not seek good relations with Europe or America, though less likely with Israel, yet it will be a very different Turkey from the one that has existed for a very long time.
In addition, this would mark a significant change in the regional power balance. It is not just, for example, a matter of the Turkish government not worrying about Iran having nuclear weapons, but the regime possibly wants Iran to have nuclear weapons because it sees that as empowering Muslims. This means it is not just sympathetic to Palestinian suffering but that it wants Hamas to take over the Palestinian leadership. It implies that Turkey does not just have problems with the U.S. over Iraq, but would like to see a very different Iraq.
Are they entering into, at least in a loose way, what Syrian President Bashar Asad calls 'the resistance camp' and that whatever they say to keep the EU happy or to avoid friction with the United States, this may be the biggest strategic shift in the Middle East since the Iranian Revolution. I do not want to overstate the case, but here is a piece of evidence. Compared to its warming toward Iran, Syria, and Hamas, we see no equivalent Turkish moves toward Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan--the opponents of the Iranian-led coalition.
Dr. Ian Lesser: The United States and Israel are being affected by something that is happening in Turkey which is not anything new. The AK is a mass party; public opinion counts. There has been a certain distortion in the way the United States sees our own relationship with Turkey. We could go and deal with a very small number of strategic elites, military, and some in the private sector, and they would give us essentially what we wanted out of a realist view of our interest. That has not gone away entirely, but it is getting very rough at the edges, and I think it is affecting both relationships.
When I was in Ankara and Istanbul, taxi drivers were donating a day's salary to a Gaza fund. Every taxi in Ankara had rather appalling photos plastered on the backs of the taxis that had been centrally distributed, but everybody had them. I was in Gaziantep at factories where there were big placards outside talking about Gaza, so this is not something that is being stirred up without there being a constituency. There is really a deep reservoir of public affinity, unease, all of these things, and its affecting both relationships.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: Let me make this suggestion. The U.S.-Turkish relationship would not be facing the problems it has without the Iraq War. The AK has used this to its advantage to boost domestic popularity and realized that it can get away with anti-American rhetoric at home if it sustains good relations with the United States in Iraq, and it worked.
What I see for the Turkish-Israeli relationship is that Hamas is doing to the Turkish-Israeli relationship what the Iraq war has done to the Turkish-American relationship. It is because the AK's sympathies are largely with Hamas as a political party, not with the Palestinians as a whole. And this is not just my own analysis. Prime Minister Erdogan sees Hamas as a party that should be dealt with and should not be isolated. Is Hamas going to disappear? No. Thus, you are going to get an incredible beating of Israel in Turkey through the Hamas factor.
You might still continue to have the Turkish-Israeli military relationship, but all of that will have to be very low key, under the radar, invisible. And I think the mid-term challenge that faces the relationship is, as Ian mentioned, the economic and cultural component of Turkish-Israeli ties. They are very strong, but can you sustain them in a country where Israelis feel physically threatened?
That is why I think eventually that leg is going to come undone when you have Israelis who go to Turkey on vacation, to invest, for conferences and they are not well received. I see a huge number of problems because the AK's sympathies are, in the final analysis, with Hamas; they don't see Hamas as a problem. Turkey invited Hamas to Ankara in 2005, and then suggested it was some kind of exceptional circumstance, but it turned out that Turkey's contacts with Hamas continued and remain strong.
TURKEY AS A MIDDLE EAST POWER
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: At the Kuwait summit, the moderates--including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt--gathered. At the Doha summit were Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Turkey. So to answer Barry's question, that is how the AK positions itself in Arab politics.
Dr. Steven Larrabee: If I could perhaps address Barry's questions, it is not true that the Turkish government does not care about whether or not Iran gets nuclear weapons. It has made it very clear privately and publicly that it opposes the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. Not because Turkey really feels a threat from Iran, but because Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons could stimulate a nuclear arms race in the region and could raise the nuclear issue in Turkey itself.
On Iran, there are a number of differences with the United States. Turkish and U.S. interests do not totally coincide. Turkey needs the United States. It wants to reduce its dependence on Russia by turning to Iran as a source of oil and natural gas.
Second, there is the Kurdish issue on which Iran and Turkey see eye-to-eye. Turkey has national interests that drive it toward an accommodation with Tehran in certain areas. The same is true in the case of Syria. But certainly on the nuclear issue the United States and Turkey see eye-to-eye much more.
Last, I think that what you are seeing is actually a shift in Turkish perspectives on its role in the Middle East. Under Ataturk and for a long time, Turkey tried to stay aloof from the Middle East and concentrated its major efforts on strengthening ties with the West.
Now, for a variety of reasons, including the changing strategic context from the end of the Cold War, many of the problems in the Middle East are on Turkey's southern borders. Turkey is beginning to return to a role that it played historically and traditionally. I would say that the Republican era, particularly under Ataturk, now is much more of an anomaly in terms of Middle East policy and Turkey's returning to a more historic role and trying to play a larger regional role. Islamic politics plays a role here, but, again, I do not think that it is the main driving force directing Turkey in these directions.
Prof. Efraim Inbar: I think the intriguing question is indeed Barry's. We can think of Turkey's view as seeing the Americans declining, for example, with the United States getting out of Iraq. Turkey has aspirations to play a role in the Middle East. They may be lining themselves up with the radicals. They may be weakening Egypt, which has been a competitor for hegemony in the Middle East. They are being pushed more into Middle Eastern politics by geography. A very interesting question will be how it would affect Turkey's policies if the Russians were to come back to the region.
Prof. Ofra Bengio: Indeed, under the AK, relations with the Middle East have changed dramatically in threat perceptions, its role in the region, and its relationship with certain specific countries. Turkey wants to play a pivotal role in the region, which some have called an Ottoman strategy. This strategy is both multilateralist and aimed at avoiding conflict with any neighbor. Turkey can work with the Arab world, the Muslim countries, and Israel as well. I do not think it will have to choose between these categories, and this is an important point.
In this context, Turkey hopes to play the role of mediator, which requires a reasonably good relationship with Israel. By turning Islam into its platform, rather than nationalism, the AK opened the door for a closer alignment with Arab countries and Iran. This was a way to advance its own bid for regional leadership. There is also a domestic component here: the economic crisis within Turkey and the hope to bring Arab financial support and investment.
Relations with Syria have undergone a major transformation, even a revolution. Turkey gave up its support for the PKK; Turkey offered to help Syria escape isolation. In exchange, one could say the competition between Turkey and Syria has been replaced by competition between Turkey and Egypt.
Another change concerns threat perceptions. Worrying about the Kurds is a constant in Turkish policy, but that threat--once linked to Iran and Syria--is now seen as emanating from Iraq. Turkey grappled with this problem of northern Iraq by cooperating with Iran and Syria on this issue. It is, however, vying with Iran for influence inside Iraq itself while also engaging the Kurdish regional government rather than having a conflict with it. Regarding relations with Iran, again we have seen a major change. Turkey no longer views Iran as an ideological threat but wants to engage Iran through negotiation and cooperation.
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Dr. Ian Lesser: I will make three points on this topic. The first is that the question of Turkey's membership in the EU is a fifteen-year project at a minimum. There is no question that the process is troubled on both sides at the moment. In order to get the process with Europe really seriously going again, Turkey has to make some concessions. It is a question of how long it will take Turkey to agree to the conditions necessary to become a member. Some Turks recognize that, but in general that is not what you see in the debate.
If you ask Turks and Europeans whether it is a good idea for Turkey to come into the European Union and whether it is likely to happen, you get an interesting result. In Turkey, most people still think it is a good idea. They see it as leading to prosperity. The numbers have been going down over time, but still many people think it is a good idea. But if you ask if it is likely they say, 'No, it is not going to happen.' The European responses are the exact opposite. Is it a good idea? No. Is it likely to happen? Yes.
Turks are very surprised to hear this result sometimes. You obviously have many people in Europe who do not like the idea but think it is inevitable. Why? It could be that they simply do not feel that they have control over the process. Other enlargements that they didn't think were necessarily such a good idea happened anyway.
You now have key political actors who are not just ambivalent but really against the idea, such as Sarkozy in France and Merkel in Germany. The economic crisis is likely to have an extremely negative effect on already unenthusiastic European views of the costs and advantages of taking in Turkey for EU membership.
If Turkey becomes--and is perceived as becoming--more and more Middle Eastern, that complicates this relationship with Europe. It gets much harder to make the case for Turkish membership. Moreover, given Turkey's other activities, it just reduces the energy and commitment to this European project. There has to be some kind of focus.
Regarding Turkey's EU membership, I don't think you are going to see anything very different from the Obama administration. It will be very committed to promoting Turkey as a member of the EU eventually. What has changed, of course, is that it gets tougher and tougher for us to make the case.
This stance does give the United States a better hearing for its interests in Turkey. But from our point of view, I think our interest is not for Turkey to become a member but for Turkey to continue to converge with Europe in different sectors that are meaningful to us.
Dr. Anat Lapidot-Firilla: We often hear the argument that the process of Turkey moving toward EU membership is more important than the goal of achieving it, but it is a strange argument. After all, it is this process that made Turkey more religious and to a certain extent created the problems we are debating now. Therefore, if there is no happy ending to the process (acceptance to the EU), the process may prove to be is a very negative one.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: You make a very interesting point.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Let us talk in more detail about Anat's point. One aspect of the EU process was to make the army weaker so that it would not have a public role. The process kicked out some of the controls that Ataturk and his successors had put in. Knowing the army is unable to act makes it easier for the AK to go further toward dismantling the republic as it has existed. Earlier in the AK's reign, the EU gave it certain benefits that strengthened its claim to being moderate and successful. So this is a great irony: The membership process was supposed to bring Turkey closer to Europe but in fact ended up pushing Turkey further away from Europe in terms of its norms and internal politics.
Dr. Ian Lesser: In terms of Turkish nationalism, which in my view is just as potent a force affecting U.S. and Israeli relations with Turkey today as Islamism--maybe more--there is a certain artificiality to this process with Europe in which Turkey feels itself continuously disappointed, not taken seriously, and not dealt with in good faith. We can argue whether that is true, but that is how it is seen. There are constantly issues arising where Turkish nationalism is stirred up. And some of this mood at the moment can be attributed to not just what the United States seems to be doing or not doing in Iraq, for example, but also what the EU does. This process issue that you mention becomes part of the substance.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: An important factor not mentioned yet is the shift in the EU's own mood, a kind of enlargement fatigue that goes beyond Turkey. The French and Dutch referendum made clear that there is real concern among the public in most European countries about the process of enlargement, and that has had an impact on the debate in the EU and, thus, on the debate in Turkey. Another thing worth noting is that in the past, EU-Turkish relations have gone up and down, but Turkey could always count on its relationship with the United States when relations with the EU were bad.
This is the first time in my memory that Turkey's relations with the EU and the United States have been simultaneously bad. This has led to a questioning of the relationship with the West, a feeling of greater vulnerability, of nationalism, a sense that Turkey can no longer rely on its traditional allies--not just the EU but also the United States. This has contributed to this more nationalistic mood and, at the same time, the growing sense of vulnerability. So it is a dangerous mixture of factors affecting Turkey's overall relations not simply with the EU but with the West as a whole. This also helps to explain why Turkey has moved toward a somewhat less pro-Western policy.
Prof. Barry Rubin: Aside from disappointments with the United States and Europe, there has also been the failed idea of a Turkic community, of a special relationship with the ex-Soviet republics. That pulled away still another alternative to a Middle East orientation and possibly a trend toward believing that Iran, Syria, and Hamas are the kind of people they want to have as allies.
Remember also that this basic idea was brought up by Erbakan, the Islamist leader and briefly prime minister, out of whose party the AK itself came. He was ridiculed at the time and ended up looking very foolish. To quote an Egyptian proverb, his idea of Turkey aligning with Arab and Muslim states was seen in Turkey as, 'No matter how many zeros you have you still have zero.'
The AK has reintroduced this notion in a more subtle way and it has become a driving force in Turkish strategy and policy. Remember that close Turkish-Israeli relations were based on the fact that Turkey's interests were opposed to those of Iran--because Iran was pushing Islamism--and Syria--because Syria was pushing radicalism and the Kurdish issue. Yet if Turkey reverses direction on these issues, it no longer needs Israel and, to some extent, the regime may feel it no longer needs Europe or America either. The real loser here is not Israel but the United States.
Dr. Ian Lesser: It also threatens to reverse some of the things that have really been very positive in terms of the EU candidacy: the talks with Greece that transcended that old rivalry, for example. A rising mood of nationalism could unravel some of these things that have actually been very positive.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: Certainly, there is a big difference between the AK's policy and that of Erbakan, which was decidedly anti-Western ideologically. The National Salvation Party and Refah were opposed to NATO membership; they were opposed to membership with the EU. What has changed is a number of factors. Iraq has had a deleterious impact on U.S.-Turkish relations, while the changes in the EU have had a deleterious impact on Turkish relations with the EU. There have been changes in Syria since 1998 that were justifiably why Turkey would want to maintain a better relationship with Syria. The same applies to Iran. So you have a change in the strategic context as well as changes within the Islamist movement itself and the victory of modernists within the internal debate.
All of these factors have come together to push Turkey in a slightly different direction that is based on a feeling that Turkey can no longer rely on its traditional allies. This gives this new direction, this effort at rebalancing, a somewhat uncertain and dangerous connotation.
Prof. Barry Rubin: You are 100 percent right about the background but that doesn't change the outcome. The question remains, however, have things passed a certain point? And would even the undoing of certain elements, for example, a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have much effect in moving things back. I am simply raising these issues and asking you to make us all feel better by explaining why this is only temporary.
Dr. Stephen Larrabee: I think these are the key questions, and this going to be very difficult to answer. My own sense is that if Congress does not pass the Armenian Resolution and the United States and Turkey can begin to move back to a better relationship, that doesn't mean we won't have differences, but again I think the differences over Iran will be mitigated somewhat by the fact that Obama is likely to open a dialogue with Teheran and the same with Syria. We will not be able to put the toothpaste back into the tube completely, but I think we can certainly halt the downward spiral that relations have been on for the past five years.
Dr. Soner Cagaptay: I think the EU factor is useful not only because it is about Turkey's transformation, but also because, as Stephen said, it provides us an anchor that could tie Turkey to the West at a time when Turkey's relations with the United States have gone through ups and downs. We should promote it.
We have had some pessimistic conversations about where Turkey is going. Turkey is changing both at home and in foreign policy. I see a slipping away from certain liberal democratic values, from Europe. We need to make sure that the EU process therefore becomes a benchmark for both Turkey's internal process, but also an anchor that ties Turkey to the West. The same points apply to NATO.
*PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES
Dr. Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism. His Ph.D. is from Yale University (2003), and he has taught courses at Yale and Princeton Universities, as well as serving as visiting professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. His latest book is Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? (Routledge, 2006).
Dr. Stephen Larrabee is Distinguished Chair in European Security at RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. He specializes in NATO, Eastern Europe, Turkey, Russia, and the Ukraine. He previously served as Vice President and Director of Studies at the Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York. His Ph.D. in political science and international affairs is from Columbia University. He makes frequent media appearances, and writes commentary in the International Herald Tribune; New York Times; United Press International; and Washington Times.
Dr. Ian Lesser is Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States. His expertise includes transatlantic relations, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey. He previously served in the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., where he led a major project on the future of U.S.-Turkish relations. He spent over a decade at RAND as a senior analyst and research manager. From 1994-1995, he was a member of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State. He received his D.Phil. from Oxford University.
Prof. Ofra Bengio is Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, and Senior Lecturer, Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. Her fields of specialization are contemporary Middle Eastern history, modern and contemporary politics of Iraq, and the Arabic language. She is the author of Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (Oxford University Press, 1998); Editor (with Gabriel Ben-Dor) of Minorities and State in the Arab World (Lynne Rienner, 1999); and The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
Prof. Efraim Inbar is a Professor in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. He completed his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago. He served as visiting professor at Johns Hopkins University (2004), at Georgetown University (1991-1992), and visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1996). His area of specialization is Middle Eastern strategic issues with a special interest in the politics and strategy of Israeli national security. His latest book is Israel's National Security: Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War (Routledge, 2008).
Dr. Anat Lapidot-Firilla is a Senior Fellow and the Academic Director of the Mediterranean unit at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. She is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Policy Studies, School of Public Policy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and teaches at the Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies Program at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research focuses on various aspects of religion, politics, and identity with an emphasis on contemporary Turkey.
Prof. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), with Walter Laqueur (Viking-Penguin); the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan); A Chronological History of Terrorism, with Judy Colp Rubin, (Sharpe); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).
________________________________________
MERIA Journal Staff
Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry Rubin
Assistant Editors: Yeru Aharoni, Anna Melman.
MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University.
Site: http://www.gloria-center.org/ - Email: info@gloria-center.org 

Turkey and Russia on the Rise

March 17, 2009

By Reva Bhalla, Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan


Russia is moving aggressively to extend its influence throughout the former Soviet empire, while Turkey is rousing itself from 90 years of post-Ottoman isolation. Both are clearly ascendant powers, and it would seem logical that the more the two bump up against one other, the more likely they will gird for yet another round in their centuries-old conflict. But while that may be true down the line, the two Eurasian powers have sufficient strategic incentives to work together for now. 
Russia’s World

Russia is among the world’s most strategically vulnerable states. Its core, the Moscow region, boasts no geographic barriers to invasion. Russia must thus expand its borders to create the largest possible buffer for its core, which requires forcibly incorporating legions of minorities who do not see themselves as Russian. The Russian government estimates that about 80 percent of Russia’s approximately 140 million people are actually ethnically Russian, but this number is somewhat suspect, as many minorities define themselves based on their use of the Russian language, just as many Hispanics in the United States define themselves by their use of English as their primary language. Thus, ironically, attaining security by creating a strategic buffer creates a new chronic security problem in the form of new populations hostile t o Moscow’s rule. The need to deal with the latter problem explains the development of Russia’s elite intelligence services, which are primarily designed for and tasked with monitoring the country’s multiethnic population.

Russia’s primary challenge, however, is time. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the bottom fell out of the Russian birthrate, with fewer than half the number of babies born in the 1990s than were born in the 1980s. These post-Cold War children are now coming of age; in a few years, their small numbers are going to have a catastrophic impact on the size of the Russian population. By contrast, most non-Russian minorities — in particular those such as Chechens and Dagestanis, who are of Muslim faith — did not suffer from the 1990s birthrate plunge, so their numbers are rapidly increasing even as the number of ethnic Russians is rapidly decreasing. Add in deep-rooted, demographic-impacting problems such as HIV, tuberculosis and heroin abuse — concentrated not just among ethnic Russians but a lso among those of childbearing age — and Russia faces a hard-wired demographic time bomb. Put simply, Russia is an ascending power in the short run, but it is a declining power in the long run. 

The Russian leadership is well aware of this coming crisis, and knows it is going to need every scrap of strength it can muster just to continue the struggle to keep Russia in one piece. To this end, Moscow must do everything it can now to secure buffers against external intrusion in the not-so-distant future. For the most part, this means rolling back Western influence wherever and whenever possible, and impressing upon states that would prefer integration into the West that their fates lie with Russia instead. Moscow’s natural gas crisis with Ukraine, August 2008 war with Georgia, efforts to eject American forces from Central Asia and constant pressure on the Baltic states all represent efforts to buy Russia more space — and with that space, more time for survival.


Expanding its buffer against such a diverse and potentially hostile collection of states is no small order, but Russia does have one major advantage: The security guarantor for nearly all of these countries is the United States, and the United States is currently very busy elsewhere. So long as U.S. ground forces are occupied with the Iraqi and Afghan wars, the Americans will not be riding to the rescue of the states on Russia’s periphery. Given this window of opportunity, the Russians have a fair chance to regain the relative security they seek. In light of the impending demographic catastrophe and the present window of opportunity, the Russians are in quite a hurry to act.

Turkey’s World
Turkey is in many ways the polar opposite of Russia. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, Turkey was pared down to its core, Asia Minor. Within this refuge, Turkey is nearly unassailable. It is surrounded by water on three sides, commands the only maritime connection between the Black and Mediterranean seas and sits astride a plateau surrounded by mountains. This is a very difficult chunk of territory to conquer. Indeed, beginning in the Seljuk Age in the 11th century, the ancestors of the modern Turks took the better part of three centuries to seize this territory from its previous occupant, the Byzantine Empire. 

The Turks have used much of the time since then to consolidate their position such that, as an ethnicity, they reign supreme in their realm. The Persians and Arabs have long since lost their footholds in Anatolia, while the Armenians were finally expelled in the dying days of World War I. Only the Kurds remain, and they do not pose a demographic challenge to the Turks. While Turkey exhibits many of the same demographic tendencies as other advanced developing states — namely, slowing birthrates and a steadily aging population — there is no major discrepancy between Turk and Kurdish birthrates, so the Turks should continue to comprise more than 80 percent of the country’s population for some time to come. Thus, while the Kurds will continue to be a source of nationalistic friction, they do not constitute a fundamental challenge to the power or operations of the Turkish state, like minorities in Russia are destined to do in the years ahead. 

Turkey’s security is not limited to its core lands. Once one moves beyond the borders of modern Turkey, the existential threats the state faced in years past have largely melted away. During the Cold War, Turkey was locked into the NATO structure to protect itself from Soviet power. But now the Soviet Union is gone, and the Balkans and Caucasus — both former Ottoman provinces — are again available for manipulation. The Arabs have not posed a threat to Anatolia in nearly a millennium, and any contest between Turkey and Iran is clearly a battle of unequals in which the Turks hold most of the cards. If anything, the Arabs — who view Iran as a hostile power with not only a heretical religion but also with a revolutionary foreign policy calling for the overthrow of most of the Arab regimes — are practically welcoming the Turks back. Despite both its imperial past and its close security association with the Americans, the Arabs see Turkey as a trusted mediator, and even an exemplar. 

With the disappearance of the threats of yesteryear, many of the things that once held Turkey’s undivided attention have become less important to Ankara. With the Soviet threat gone, NATO is no longer critical. With new markets opening up in the former Soviet Union, Turkey’s obsession with seeking EU membership has faded to a mere passing interest. Turkey has become a free agent, bound by very few relationships or restrictions, but dabbling in events throughout its entire periphery. Unlike Russia, which feels it needs an empire to survive, Turkey is flirting with the idea of an empire simply because it can — and the costs of exploring the option are negl igible. 

Whereas Russia is a state facing a clear series of threats in a very short time frame, Turkey is a state facing a veritable smorgasbord of strategic options under no time pressure whatsoever. Within that disconnect lies the road forward for the two states — and it is a road with surprisingly few clashes ahead in the near term. 
The Field of Competition

There are four zones of overlapping interest for the Turks and Russians. 

First, the end of the Soviet empire opened up a wealth of economic opportunities, but very few states have proven adept at penetrating the consumer markets of Ukraine and Russia. Somewhat surprisingly, Turkey is one of those few states. Thanks to the legacy of Soviet central planning, Russian and Ukrainian industry have found it difficult to retool away from heavy industry to produce the consumer goods much in demand in their markets. Because most Ukrainians and Russians cannot afford Western goods, Turkey has carved out a robust and lasting niche with its lower-cost exports; it is now the largest supplier of imports to the Russian market. While this is no exercise in hard power, this Turkish penetration nevertheless is cause for much concern among Russian authorities. 

So far, Turkey has been scrupulous about not politicizing these useful trade links beyond some intelligence-gathering efforts (particularly in Ukraine). Considering Russia’s current financial problems, having a stable source of consumer goods — especially one that is not China — is actually seen as a positive. At least for now, the Russian government would rather see its trade relationship with Turkey stay strong. There will certainly be a clash later — either as Russia weakens or as Turkey becomes more ambitious — but for now, the Russians are content with the trade relationship. 

Second, the Russian retreat in the post-Cold War era has opened up the Balkans to Turkish influence. Romania, Bulgaria and the lands of the former Yugoslavia are all former Ottoman possessions, and in their day they formed the most advanced portion of the Ottoman economy. During the Cold War, they were all part of the Communist world, with Romania and Bulgaria formally incorporated into the Soviet bloc. While most of these lands are now absorbed into the European Union, Russia’s ties to its fellow Slavs — most notably the Serbs and Bulgarians — have allowed it a degree of influence that most Europeans choose to ignore. Additionally, Russia has long held a friendly relationship with Greece and Cyprus, both to complicate American policy in Europe and to provide a flank against Turkey. Still, thanks to proximity and trading links, Turkey clearly holds the upper hand in this theater of competition. 

But this particular region is unlikely to generate much Turkish-Russian animosity, simply because both countries are in the process of giving up. 

Most of the Balkan states are already members of an organization that is unlikely to ever admit Russia or Turkey: the European Union. Russia simply cannot meet the membership criteria, and Cyprus’ membership in essence strikes the possibility of Turkish inclusion. (Any EU member can veto the admission of would-be members.) The EU-led splitting of Kosovo from Serbia over Russian objections was a body blow to Russian power in the region, and the subsequent EU running of Kosovo as a protectorate greatly limited Turkish influence as well. Continuing EU expansion means that Turkish influence in the Balkans will shrivel just as Russian influence already has. Trouble this way lies, but not between Turkey and Russia. If anything, their joint exclusion might provide some room for the two to agree on something. 

The third area for Russian-Turkish competition is in energy, and this is where things get particularly sticky. Russia is Turkey’s No. 1 trading partner, with energy accounting for the bulk of the trade volume between the two countries. Turkey depends on Russia for 65 percent of its natural gas and 40 percent of its oil imports. Though Turkey has steadily grown its trade relationship with Russia, it does not exactly approve of Moscow’s penchant for using its energy relations with Europe as a political weapon. Russia has never gone so far as to cut supplies to Turkey directly, but Turkey has been indirectly affected more than once when Russia decided to cut supplies to Ukraine because Moscow felt the need to reassert its writ in Kiev.

Sharing the Turks’ energy anxiety, the Europeans have been more than eager to use Turkey as an energy transit hub for routes that would bypass the Russians altogether in supplying the European market. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is one such route, and others, like Nabucco, are still stuck in the planning stages. The Russians have every reason to pressure the Turks into staying far away from any more energy diversification schemes that could cost Russia one of its biggest energy clients — and deny Moscow much of the political leverage it currently holds over the Europeans who are dependent on the Russian energy network. 

There are only two options for the Turks in diversifying away from the Russians. The first lies to Turkey’s south in Iraq and Iran. Turkey has big plans for Iraq’s oil industry, but it will still take considerable time to upgrade and restore the oil fields and pipelines that have been persistently sabotaged and ransacked by insurgents during the fighting that followed the 2003 U.S. invasion. The Iranians offer another large source of energy for the Turks to tap into, but the political complications attached to dealing with Iran are still too prickly for the Turks to move ahead with concrete energy deals at this time. Complications remain for now, but Turkey wi ll be keeping an eye on its Middle Eastern neighbors for robust energy partnerships in the future. 

The second potential source of energy for the Turks lies in Central Asia, a region that Russia must keep in its grip at all costs if it hopes to survive in the long run. In many ways this theater is the reverse of the Balkans, where the Russians hold the ethnic links and the Turks the economic advantage. Here, four of the five Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan — are Turkic. But as a consequence of the Soviet years, the infrastructure and economies of all four are so hardwired into the Russian sphere of influence that it would take some major surgery to liberate them. But the prize is a rich one: Central Asia possesses the world& #8217;s largest concentration of untapped energy reserves. And as the term “central” implies, whoever controls the region can project power into the former Soviet Union, China and South Asia. If the Russians and Turks are going to fight over something, this is it. 

Here Turkey faces a problem, however — it does not directly abut the region. If the Turks are even going to attempt to shift the Central Asian balance of power, they will need a lever. This brings us to the final — and most dynamic — realm of competition: the Caucasus. 

Turkey here faces the best and worst in terms of influence projection. The Azerbaijanis do not consider themselves simply Turkic, like the Central Asians, but actually Turkish. If there is a country in the former Soviet Union that would consider not only allying with but actually joining with another state to escape Russia’s orbit, it would be Azerbaijan with Turkey. Azerbaijan has its own significant energy supplies, but its real value is in serving as a willing springboard for Turkish influence into Central Asia. 

However, the core of Azerbaijan does not border Turkey. Instead, it is on the other side of Armenia, a country that thrashed Azerbaijan in a war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and still has lingering animosities toward Ankara because of the 1915 Armenian “genocide.” Armenia has sold itself to the Russians to keep its Turkish foes at bay. 

This means Turkish designs on Central Asia all boil down to the former Soviet state of Georgia. If Turkey can bring Georgia fully under its wing, Turkey can then set about to integrate with Azerbaijan and project influence into Central Asia. But without Georgia, Turkey is hamstrung before it can even begin to reach for the real prize in Central Asia. 

In this, the Turks do not see the Georgians as much help. The Georgians do not have much in the way of a functional economy or military, and they have consistently overplayed their hand with the Russians in the hopes that the West would come to their aid. Such miscalculations contributed to the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war, in which Russia smashed what military capacity the Georgians did possess. So while Ankara sees the Georgians as reliably anti-Russian, it does not see them as reliably competent or capable. 

This means that Turkish-Russian competition may have been short-circuited before it even began. Meanwhile, the Americans and Russians are beginning to outline the rudiments of a deal. Various items on the table include Russia allowing the Americans to ship military supplies to Afghanistan via Russia’s sphere of influence, changes to the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, and a halt to NATO expansion. The last prong is a critical piece of Russian-Turkish competition. Should the Americans and Europeans put their weight behind NATO expansion, Georgia would be a logical candidate — meaning most of the heavy lifting in terms of Turkey projecting power eastward would already be done. But if the Americans and Europeans do not put their weight behind NATO expansion, Georgia would fall by the wayside and Turkey would have to do all the work of projecting power eastward — and facing the Russians — alone. 

A Temporary Meeting of Minds?
There is clearly no shortage of friction points between the Turks and the Russians. With the two powers on a resurgent path, it was only a matter of time before they started bumping into one another. The most notable clash occurred when the Russians decided to invade Georgia last August, knowing full well that neither the Americans nor the Europeans would have the will or capability to intervene on behalf of the small Caucasian state. NATO’s strongest response was a symbolic show of force that relied on Turkey, as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea, to allow a buildup of NATO vessels near the Georgian coast and threaten the underbelly of Russia’s former Soviet peri phery. 

Turkey disapproved of the idea of Russian troops bearing down in the Caucasus near the Turkish border, and Ankara was also angered by having its energy revenues cut off during the war when the BTC pipeline was taken offline. 

The Russians promptly responded to Turkey’s NATO maneuvers in the Black Sea by holding up a large amount of Turkish goods at various Russian border checkpoints to put the squeeze on Turkish exports. But the standoff was short-lived; soon enough, the Turks and Russians came to the negotiating table to end the trade spat and sort out their respective spheres of influence. The Russian-Turkish negotiations have progressed over the past several months, with Russian and Turkish leaders now meeting fairly regularly to sort out the issues where both can find some mutual benefit.

The first area of cooperation is Europe, where both Russia and Turkey have an interest in applying political pressure. Despite Europe’s objections and rejections, the Turks are persistent in their ambitions to become a member of the European Union. At the same time, the Russians need to keep Europe linked into the Russian energy network and divided over any plans for BMD, NATO expansion or any other Western plan that threatens Russian national security. As long as Turkey stalls on any European energy diversification projects, the more it can demand Europe’s attention on the issue of EU membership. In fact, the Turks already threatened as much at the start of the year, when they said outright that if Europe doesn’t need Turkey as an EU member, then Turkey doesn’t need to sign off on any more energy diversification projects that transit Turkish territory. Ankara’s threats against Europe dovetailed nicely with Russia’s natural gas cutoff to Ukraine in January, when the Europeans once again were reminded of Moscow’s energy wrath.

The Turks and the Russians also can find common ground in the Middle East. Turkey is again expanding its influence deep into its Middle Eastern backyard, and Ankara expects to take the lead in handling the thorny issues of Iran, Iraq and Syria as the United States draws down its presence in the region and shifts its focus to Afghanistan. What the Turks want right now is stability on their southern flank. That means keeping Russia out of mischief in places like Iran, where Moscow has threatened to sell strategic S-300 air defense systems and to boost the Iranian nuclear program in order to grab Washington’s attention on other issues deemed vital to Moscow’s national security interests. The United States is already leaning on Russia to pressure Iran in return for other strategic concessions, and the Turks are just as interested as the Americans in taming Russia’s actions in the Middle East.

Armenia is another issue where Russia and Turkey may be having a temporary meeting of minds. Russia unofficially occupies Armenia and has been building up a substantial military presence in the small Caucasian state. Turkey can either sit back, continue to isolate Armenia and leave it for the Russians to dominate through and through, or it can move toward normalizing relations with Yerevan and dealing with Russia on more equal footing in the Caucasus. With rumors flying of a deal on the horizon between Yerevan and Ankara (likely with Russia’s blessing), it appears more and more that the Turks and the Russians are making progress in sorting out their respective spheres of influence.

Ultimately, both Russia and Turkey know that this relationship is likely temporary at best. The two Eurasian powers still distrust each other and have divergent long-term goals, even if in the short term there is a small window of opportunity for Turkish and Russian interests to overlap. The law of geopolitics dictates that the two ascendant powers are doomed to clash — just not today.


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source: www.stratfor.com